Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 42 | Number 5

2015

You Didn't Even Notice! Elements of Effective
Online Privacy Policies
Amanda Grannis

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Amanda Grannis, You Didn't Even Notice! Elements of Effective Online Privacy Policies, 42 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1109 (2015).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol42/iss5/1

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Article 1

YOU DIDN’T EVEN NOTICE! ELEMENTS OF
EFFECTIVE ONLINE PRIVACY POLICIES
Amanda Grannis*
Introduction ...........................................................................................1110
I. The Landscape of Notice in U.S. Privacy Law ...............................1113
A. The Federal Trade Commission and Notice and Choice .1113
B. The FTC’s Harm-Based Model ...........................................1116
C. Statutory Protections of Privacy ..........................................1118
D. Common Law Notice Standards Applied to the Digital
Age........................................................................................1120
II. Exploring the Elements of Effective Legal Notice ......................1123
A. Arbitration Clauses Viewed as Contracts: Actual and
Constructive Notice ............................................................1123
1. Contract Remedies for Insufficient Notice of
Arbitration Clauses .......................................................1128
2. Arbitration Clauses Viewed as Waivers: The
“Voluntary and Knowing” Standard...........................1131
B. FDA Labeling Rules .............................................................1134
1. Standardized Content in FDA Labeling Rules ...........1135
2. User-friendly Formatting ...............................................1136
3. Symbolic Visual Cues .....................................................1139
C. FTC Enforcement Actions ...................................................1140
1. Unauthorized Disclosure of Personal Information .....1141
2. Surreptitious Collection of Personal Information .......1142
3. Failure to Secure Personal Information .......................1145
4. Unlawful Retention of Personal Information..............1146

*

J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2016; B.A., Binghamton University, 2012.
I would like to thank my wonderful professor Joel Reidenberg, who advised me
throughout the note writing process. I could not have written this article without his
remarkable guidance and insights. I would also like to thank Professor Cameron
Russell of the Fordham Center on Law and Information Policy (CLIP), who helped
inspire me to write this note. I would also like to thank my eternally supportive
parents Mark and Sandra Grannis, who have helped me every step of the way
throughout law school. Finally, I would like to thank Josh Lampert, who has been a
constant source of love and encouragement.

1109

1110

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

D. Notice Problems in the Online World ................................1146
1. The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies ...........................1147
2. Ambiguity and Consumer Misunderstanding ..............1149
a. Ambiguity of Privacy Policy Language...................1149
b. Misunderstanding of Privacy Policy Text ...............1151
c. False Assumptions and Lack of Awareness ...........1152
III. Elements of Effective Online Notice ...........................................1154
A. The Format of Effective Notice ..........................................1155
1. Readable Text .................................................................1155
2. Conspicuous Disclosures ................................................1158
B. The Content of Effective Notice..........................................1160
1. Accurate Disclosures ......................................................1160
2. Precise Language ............................................................1161
3. Affirmative Consent to Modified Material Terms .....1163
4. “Knowing and Voluntary” Assent ................................1164
Conclusion ..............................................................................................1166

INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 2015, electronic retailer RadioShack filed for
RadioShack previously
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.1
announced that it planned to sell the personally identifiable
information of 117 million consumers in asset auctions across several
states.2
The following month, RadioShack sought to sell its
“transaction data,” along with 8.5 million customer email addresses
and 67 million customer names and address files.3 This trove of
personal data would be a valuable asset to third party marketers,4 as it
would reveal what items customers purchased, where they purchased
it, and how much they paid.5
Ultimately, a bankruptcy judge approved the sale of RadioShack’s
customer data for $26 million, which after negotiations sold the names

1. Katy Stech, Privacy Concerns Raised as RadioShack Prepares to Sell
WALL
STREET
J.
(Apr.
28,
2015),
Data,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/privacy-concerns-raised-as-radioshack-prepares-to-sellcustomer-data-1430252834 [https://perma.cc/2FCF-G3MJ].
2. Randall Chase, RadioShack Agrees To Mediation With Attorneys General
Over Bankruptcy Sale Of Customer Data, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/04/28/radioshack-agrees-tomediation-over-sale-of-customer-data [https://perma.cc/V5UJ-WRMQ].
3. Chase, supra note 2.
4. See Stech, supra note 1.
5. Chase, supra note 2.

Customer
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and addresses of 67 million former customers.6 This controversial sale
not only alarmed the public and state regulators, but arguably directly
breached RadioShack’s privacy policy.7
Indeed, RadioShack’s
privacy policy provided that it would not “sell or rent” customers’
“personally identifiable information to anyone at any time.”8
RadioShack’s privacy policy also claimed that it “respect[ed]”
customer’s privacy, and would abstain from selling its mailing lists.9
How could RadioShack break its own privacy promises and operate
against former assurances to customers?
The RadioShack case typifies systematic problems of privacy
policies and online notice. Sometimes, companies like RadioShack
will break their own promises to customers, and appropriate
consumer data in ways that the average consumers would not
anticipate.10 More often, however, privacy policies are vague or silent
about core data practices.11 Commercial websites often collect, share,
and retain consumer information without mentioning these practices
or disclosing their specific details in privacy policies.12 Furthermore,
the verbose and legalistic character of policy language often makes it
difficult for consumers to understand privacy terms,13 and the format
of privacy policies deters consumers from reading them. Research
shows that the majority of consumers do not read privacy policies14
and this may be because they are often displayed in dense paragraphs
of crowded text.
6. See Nick Brown, U.S. Judge Rules RadioShack IP Auction Was Fair,
REUTERS (May 20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-radioshack-bankruptcyidUSKBN0O52I120150520 [https://perma.cc/SYC9-7GML].
7. See State Of Texas’s Limited Objection To Sale Of Personally Identifiable
Information Of One Hundred Seventeen Million Consumers, In re RadioShack
Corporation, et al., 2015 WL 641870, No. 15-10197-KJC, 3 (Bankr. Del. Mar. 20,
2015) (No. 1393).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3-4.
10. See, e.g., Complaint, at 2, In re Upromise, Inc., FTC File No. 102 3116, No. C4351 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Upromise Complaint].
11. See J. R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches
Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 87 (2015).
12. See Fact Sheet 18: Online Privacy: Using the Internet Safely, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARING HOUSE (Jan. 2016), https://www.privacyrights.org/online-privacy-usinginternet-safely [https://perma.cc/8KHF-JV2M].
13. See Irene Pollach, What’s Wrong with Online Privacy Policies?, 50 COMM’N
OF THE ACM 103, 104 (2007).
14. See Sarah Gordon, Privacy: A Study of Attitudes and Behaviors in US, UK
and EU Information Security Professionals, SYSTEMATIC SECURITY RESPONSE 12
(2003).
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In response to these prevalent issues, this Note explores how
companies alter their privacy policies so that they will become usable
notice mechanisms of online data collection and dissemination
practices. Part I analyzes common law and statutory sources of notice
regulation in the United States. Part I also addresses the Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC) privacy jurisprudence as well as notice
and choice, the dominant model for displaying and attaining users
consent to the terms of online privacy policies.
Part II examines and extracts the most salient principles of
effective notice from established relevant legal models. Each legal
model represents a different aspect of commercial practice, and their
notice standards thus provides valuable insights for conveying
effective notice in the context of commercial websites and online
consumer transactions. To illustrate greater standards of notice in the
domain of commercial contracts, this section first studies notice
requirements of enforceable arbitration agreements. The second
legal model discussed is the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
over-the-counter (OTC) drug labeling rule. This section examines
FDA labeling practices to highlight what constitutes sufficient notice
and warnings in highly regulated industries. Part II then describes
different FTC enforcement actions that relate to consumer privacy
harms as a reflection of greater notice and privacy standards of
general commercial entities. Part II concludes with an overview of
some of the most prominent issues pertaining to online notice today.
Part III extrapolates core principles from the three legal models to
articulate the elements of effective online notice. This Note does not
purport to outline an exhaustive list of essential elements. Rather,
these elements are intended to inform expectations of what effective
notice should be in the online world. These elements pertain to both
the format and content of effective notice, as each of these aspects has
a vital impact on consumer understanding of privacy terms. Part III
also discusses what tactics commercial websites should implement to
sufficiently communicate the nature and scope of their data collection
practices to consumers. Moreover, this Part offers a greater analytical
framework for addressing online notice problems.
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I. THE LANDSCAPE OF NOTICE IN U.S. PRIVACY LAW
A. The Federal Trade Commission and Notice and Choice
Privacy law in the United States is often described as “sectoral”15
because there is no one dominant source of privacy legislation.16
Privacy laws operate like a patchwork quilt of various state law
privacy torts, federal statutes, and administrative rules.17 In terms of
government regulation, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the
main federal agency that regulates the privacy space.18 Congress
created the FTC in 1914 after it enacted the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA) to protect consumers and promote
competition.19 In 1995, the FTC began to shift its focus to online
consumer privacy issues,20 as the Internet was becoming more
ubiquitous and the online marketplace was burgeoning.21 During this
time, the FTC endorsed a policy of privacy self-regulation, in which it
entrusted consumers to make their own decisions and judgments
about their privacy.22 The FTC began to clarify and define this model
of privacy self-regulation in a 2000 report.23 In the report, the FTC
determined that commercial entities that collected consumers’
personally identifiable data must comply with the “fair information
practice principles” of “Notice” and “Choice.”24 The FTC explained

15. Sectoral refers to the various sources of privacy law.
16. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 910 (2009).
17. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (referring to U.S. privacy law as
a “hodgepodge” of different “constitutional protections, federal and state statutes,
torts, regulatory rules, and treaties”); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in
Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 887–89 (2003).
18. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 587.
19. See
Our
History,
THE
FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history [https://perma.cc/HD2D-5JZK].
20. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2
(1998)
21. Id. at 40. (“The World Wide Web provides a host of opportunities for
businesses to gather a vast array of personal information from and about consumers,
including children. The online environment and the advent of the computer age also
provide unprecedented opportunities for the compilation, analysis, and dissemination
of such information.”).
22. See Gina Stevens, The Federal Trade Commission’s Regulation of Data
Security Under Its Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) Authority, CONG.
RES. SERVS. 3 (Sept. 11, 2014).
23. See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In
The Electronic Marketplace A Report To Congress (May 2000) [hereinafter Privacy
Online]. The Commission named four information practice requirements in total:
Notice, Choice, Access, and Security.
24. See id. at 12.
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that “Notice” required entities to give consumers “clear and
conspicuous notice” of their information practices “before any
personal information is collected.”25 The FTC stated that “Notice”
was the “most fundamental” principle because it was a “prerequisite
to implementing other fair information practice principles, such as
Choice.”26 According to the principle of “Choice,” entities must give
consumers options pertaining to how “any personal information
collected . . . may be used for purposes beyond those necessary to
complete a contemplated transaction.”27 Such “purposes” may
include sharing consumer information with third parties or using it for
marketing products.28
The FTC premised the notice and choice model on the belief that
companies would disclose their data collection practices to
consumers, and consumers would self-manage their privacy by
offering or denying their consent.29 The FTC asserted that privacy
notices should be seen as a way to help consumers understand what
information is collected about them and what is done with that
information.30 In response to the FTC’s endorsement of a policy of
privacy self-regulation, companies began to draft and post privacy
policies on their commercial websites.31 Not only could these policies
promote companies’ privacy practices, but could also help to “stave
off” formal privacy regulations from Congress.32 Eventually, privacy
policies became fairly ubiquitous in online commercial practice.33 In
1998, only two percent of websites displayed privacy policies—by
2000, nearly all websites featured them.34

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized
Mechanisms For Privacy Notice And Choice, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
273, 277-79 (2012).
30. See Howard Beales, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Privacy Notices and the
Federal Trade Commission 2002 Privacy Agenda, 2002 WL 1713227 (Jan. 24, 2002),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2002/01/privacy-notices-and-federal-tradecommissions-2002-privacy-agenda [https://perma.cc/6ZGG-VYLA].
31. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 592-95 (explaining that as a general
matter, privacy policies describe websites’ terms of use and the nature of their data
collection practices and privacy policies have the same binding force as any other
legal contract and are usually featured on a separate webpage of a website).
32. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 594.
33. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 594.
34. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 594.
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The self-regulatory regime of notice and choice remains in place
today.35 Companies display disclosure statements pertaining to their
data collection practices on their websites, and consumers can choose
to read those disclosures and decide to consent to privacy terms.36
Nevertheless, in 2000, the FTC reported that only about twenty
percent of privacy policies that were studied implemented, at least in
part, the criteria for the “Fair Information Practice Principles.”37 The
FTC determined that privacy legislation, in addition to selfregulation, would allow the “electronic marketplace to reach its full
potential” and increase consumer confidence.38 Congress did not
enact the recommended legislation, and the FTC began to
increasingly rely on its statutory authority in order to protect
consumers’ privacy.39
The FTC’s statutory grant of power enables it to enforce the
promises that companies make in their privacy policies.40 The FTC’s
statutory authority arises from Section 5 of the FTCA.41 Section 5
states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are . . . unlawful.”42 Pursuant to Section 5, the FTC files complaints
against companies that engage in “unfair” or “deceptive” online
practices.43 Though the FTC provides no enumerated examples of
“unfair” and “deceptive” commercial practices, 44 the FTC interprets
this language to include unfair and deceptive uses of consumers’
personal information.45 The FTC defines a deceptive practice as one
that is a “representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead

35.
36.
37.
38.

See Cranor, supra note 29, at 277.
See Cranor, supra note 29, at 277.
See Privacy Online, supra note 23, at 12-13.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY

IN AN

ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND
POLICYMAKERS 8 (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY].
39. See id.
40. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 598.
41. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
43. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 598-99.
44. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 312 n.2 (“It is
impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit
to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again.
If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless
task” (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No.1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914))).
45. Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/ourdivisions/division-privacy-and-identity [https://perma.cc/5EE8-AXUL].
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the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer’s detriment.”46 Generally, a misleading act or broken
promise, such as when companies breach their own privacy policies,
will satisfy this language.47 The FTC maintains that an “unfair
practice” is one that causes or is likely to cause “substantial injury”
that is not “reasonably avoidable” or “outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition.”48 An “unfair practice” need
not entail a misleading act or broken promise.49 Rather, “unfair”
practices include monetary, health or safety injuries.50
B. The FTC’s Harm-Based Model
In the early 2000s, the FTC focused on addressing harms to online
consumers as a means of confronting greater privacy issues.51 Under
its harm-based model, the FTC advanced online consumer protection
claims in response to known privacy harms, which included data
security breaches, identity theft, children’s privacy and spyware.52
The number of FTC privacy enforcement actions has since grown
steadily since the FTC first started to address and regulate privacy
harms online.53 This growth is likely in response to companies’ new
business models that collect and share online consumers’ personally
identifiable information. For example, online social media networks
capture consumer data through personalized account profiles.54
Likewise, location-based mobile applications, which provide
consumers with uses like navigation services and weather reports,

46. FTC Policy Statement on Deception (1983), appended to Final
Order, Cliffdale
Assocs.,
Inc.,
103
F.T.C.
110,
174
(1984), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm
[https://perma.cc/E289HBV5];
47. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the
Notice and Choice Framework, FORDHAM CTR. ON L. & INFO. POL’Y, 19 (2014),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2015/01/Privacy-Harms-and-Noticeand-Choice-01-12-2015-1-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YRL-LLK8]. Companies that do
not have privacy policies, or fail to include certain provisions in their privacy policies,
will not be charged with committing “deceptive” practices. Rather, companies must
make positive statements in their privacy policies that mislead consumers’
expectations of privacy. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
49. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 19.
50. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 19.
51. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 9.
52. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 10.
53. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 600 (observing that the FTC brought nine
privacy-related complaints in 2002, but brought twenty-four privacy-related
complaints in 2012).
54. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 58.
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gather satellite information on consumers’ geographic location.55
More so, online behavioral advertisers market personalized products
and services to consumers on the web by tracking consumers’
browsing habits over time.56
Due to technological advancements and increased computing
power, many companies are now capable of collecting a variety of
consumer data in vast amounts.57 Some of this data may include
personally identifiable information like consumers’ Social Security
numbers, names, addresses, telephone numbers, credit or debit card
numbers, bank account numbers, driver’s license numbers, or precisegeolocation data.58
Companies also profit from the consumer data that they collect and
share. Companies may collect personal data and proceed to sell or
rent it to third parties.59 They may also share this information with
marketing affiliates in order to profile the behavior of users that visit
their websites.60 Companies may also share this information with
third party behavioral advertisers, which rely on consumer data to
deliver personalized advertising.61 Companies often fail to disclose
how long they retain consumer data after collection.62 However,
some companies have retained consumer data for extended periods,
and as seen with RadioShack, can even attempt to sell off their
databases during bankruptcy.63
As companies found new ways to collect and share a greater
quantity and variety of data, the FTC filed a greater number of
complaints in response to incidental privacy harms.64 Some of the
alleged privacy harms cited in such complaints are linked with
findings of insufficient notice. For example, the FTC has filed

55. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 21.
56. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 21. See generally
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and
Consent, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION (2009).
57. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 21.
58. See In re HTC Am. Inc., FTC File No. 122 3049, No. C-4406, at 2 (F.T.C. June
25, 2013).
59. See JOSHUA GOMEZ ET AL., KNOW PRIVACY, U.C. BERKELEY, SCHL. OF INFO.
9 (Jun. 1, 2009).
60. See id.
61. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 1.
62. See GOMEZ ET AL., supra note 59, at 25.
63. See Stech, supra note 1; see generally Brian Carroll, Price of Privacy: Selling
Consumer Databases in Bankruptcy, 16 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 47 (2002).
64. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 600.
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complaints against companies that fail to apprise consumers of their
data collection practices.65 The FTC’s position is that without proper
disclosure of data collection practices, consumers can not offer
informed consent.66 Similarly, the FTC has filed complaints against
companies for collecting consumer data without consumers’
knowledge.67 Some complaints allege instances of privacy harm when
companies offer consumers installable software that, unbeknownst to
consumers, collects personally identifiable information.68
FTC
jurisprudence characterizes such covert collection as a “deceptive”
under Section 5.69
After filing a complaint, the FTC grants the respondents the option
to settle or dispute the charges in administrative court.70 Most cases,
however, are dropped or settled through the FTC’s consent orders,
which are similar to settlement agreements.71 Though consent orders
have the legal force of a contract between the FTC and respondent
company, they sometimes, as a practical matter, have precedential
value.72 Other companies that read these orders may opt to comply
with them in order to avoid similar charges for privacy harms.73
C. Statutory Protections of Privacy
In addition to FTC enforcement actions, some federal laws also
define and protect consumers’ privacy rights. These statutes tend to
be directed toward a specific industry or sector, and the FTC often

65. See e.g., Complaint, FTC v. Frostwire LLC, FTC File No. 112 3041, No. 111cv-236443 (F.T.C. Oct. 7, 2011); Complaint, In re Red Zone Inv. Grp., Inc. FTC File
No. 112 3151, No. C-4396 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2013).
66. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 25-26.
67. See, e.g., Complaint, In re Aspen Way Enters., Inc., FTC File No. 1123151,
No. C-4392 (F.T.C. Sept. 25, 2012) (collecting user data through secretly installed
software on rental computers) [hereinafter In re Aspen Way Complaint]; Complaint,
In re Epic Marketplace, Inc., File No. 112 3182, No. C-4389 (F.T.C. Dec. 5, 2012)
(collecting browsing history data).
68. See Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 5.
69. See In re Aspen Way Complaint, supra note 67, at 5.
70. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 609.
71. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 610, 611 n.120 (noting that out of 154
FTC complaints, only six lacked an accompanying settlement agreement).
72. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 607.
73. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 607 (“[A]lleged violations
precipitating the consent orders reflect conduct the FTC believes is a violation of
Section 5 . . . and companies that engage in the same or similar conduct can expect
an investigation and an allegation of illegal conduct from the FTC” (quoting Email
from Chris Wolf, Dir., Privacy & Info. Mgmt. Grp., Hogan Lovells, to author (Mar.
31, 2013, 11:21 AM) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
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has authority to enforce them.74 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for
example, prohibits financial institutions from disclosing consumers’
non-public personal information to unaffiliated third parties.75
Pursuant to the Act, financial institutions are obliged to provide
notices of their privacy policies to consumers and to give consumers
reasonable opportunity to opt-out of disclosing personal information
to third parties.76 Compliant financial institutions must supply a
notice statement of their privacy policies at the time a consumer
relationship is established and at least once every twelve months
thereafter.77 In addition to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the privacy
rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) protects personally identifiable health information held or
transmitted by health plans, insurers, and health providers.78 HIPAA
prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information relating to
patients’ identities or health status.79 Such information includes
patients’ medical histories, payment records, Social Security numbers,
names, addresses, and email addresses.80
State laws also reserve special privacy rights for citizens.81 For
instance, California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 requires
commercial websites that collect personally identifiable information
to prominently post privacy policies and identify the kinds of data
they collect from consumers.82 Under this law, websites must disclose
any processes that they maintain for allowing consumers to review
and change their personally identifiable information.83 California law
not only regulates how websites may disclose their privacy practices,
but also how they collect consumer data.84
California’s
74. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 4.
75. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et. seq. (2012).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 6802.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 6803.
78. HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.103, 164.500 (2013).
79. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.103, 164.502 (2013).
80. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(2)(i) (2013). Beyond the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act and
HIPAA, other federal privacy statutes, such as the CAN-SPAM Act (which regulates
how commercial entities send advertising emails to consumers), and the
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, were also enacted to
protect privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq. (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. (2012).
81. See e.g., California Invasion of Privacy Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 et seq.
(West 2015).
82. Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575-22579
(West 2015).
83. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(b)(2).
84. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575-22579.
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Consumer Protection Against
Computer Spyware Act
prohibits
unauthorized users from knowingly copying software on consumers’
computers to surreptitiously collect personally identifiable
information that “includes all or substantially all of the Web sites
visited by an authorized user.”85 This law prohibits companies from
installing spyware on the computers of unknowing consumers.86
D. Common Law Notice Standards Applied to the Digital Age
Principles of effective notice are central to privacy-related
enforcement actions as well as to some federal and state privacy
statutes. Demonstrating effective notice is also critical throughout
traditional legal areas, such as tort law,87 corporate law,88 and property
law.89 The principle of notice is of particular importance to common
law contracts.90 Contract theory is premised on the reasoning that
parties have “freedom of contract.”91 The ability to enter contacts has
traditionally been viewed as a “fundamental” right because it reflects
parties’ liberties to control the disposition of their property and alter

85. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 22947.2 (West 2015).
86. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947.3 (West 2015).
87. See generally Bremer v. W. W. Smith, Inc., 126 Pa. Super. 408 (1937) (holding
that proof of an injured party’s notice of hazardous conditions provided a defense in
a premises liability suit). But see Mack v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 93 A. 618 (Pa. 1915)
(holding defendant railroad had constructive notice of a grease spot due to the
presence of footprints and was negligent because it did not apprise injured parties
with a proper warning of hazardous conditions).
88. See generally In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106
(Del. Ch. 2009) (demonstrating Delaware courts’ reference to the “Red Flag”
doctrine when imposing a duty to monitor upon directors who know or have reason
to know of employees’ illegal conduct).
89. See 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 57 (2015) (providing adverse
possession of land must be “open and notorious” in order to put landowners on
sufficient notice of the trespass of their property).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS DEFINED § 1 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes as a duty.”).
91. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1873) (holding that
citizens have the right to contract without unreasonable government interference and
that this right was protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). See generally David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract, GEO. MASON
L.
&
ECON.
RES.
PAPER
SERIES,
No.
08-51
(2008),
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/0851%20Freedom%20of%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LAU-FJ7Z] (discussing
the notion of freedom of contact and its place in U.S. Jurisprudence).
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their legal relationships.92 By their very nature, contracts enable
parties to structure an agreement on their own terms and attribute
that agreement with legally binding status.93 However, if a party does
not receive sufficient notice of a contract’s substantive terms at the
formation stage, the agreement may be unenforceable.94 This is
because parties may not be able to meaningfully assent to terms that
they are unaware of or do not understand.95 Contracts are only
enforceable if both parties mutually agree to their conditions.96
Models of sufficient notice in common law contracts have shaped
legal precedents in the privacy space. In the landmark case Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp., then-Second Circuit Judge
Sotomayor relied on traditional notice principles when concluding
that that plaintiffs did not manifest consent to an arbitration clause in
a browsewrap licensing agreement.97 In browsewrap agreements,
websites display their terms of use at the bottom of a webpage.98

92. See David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental
Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 51, 56 (2013).
93. The process of contract formation entails the formal steps of offer, a
bargained-for exchange (also known as consideration) and acceptance of the offer.
Fiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“The basic
requirements for a contract include offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of
the minds of the contracting parties.”).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: REQUIREMENT OF A BARGAIN §
17 (1981) (“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.”).
95. See Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. Of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062 (2007)
(“[A]n offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless he knows of its existence.”)
(quoting 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:13
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990)); Trimble v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 234 A.D. 427, 431
(N.Y. App. Div. 1932) (“An offer may not be accepted until it is made and brought to
the attention of the one accepting.”).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: REQUIREMENT OF A BARGAIN §
17. See also Motise v. Am. Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that the plaintiff was not bound by AOL’s forum selection clause because
the agreement failed to appear “on screen,” and the plaintiff was not given enough
notice); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 613 (2007) (“The most obvious
challenge to the enforceability of an online privacy policy as a binding contract is that
the website visitor failed to assent to the agreement. A contract is only enforceable if
both parties have manifested their assent to its terms”).
97. 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002).
98. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014)
(explaining in “‘browsewrap’ agreements . . . a website’s terms and conditions of use
are generally posted at the bottom of the screen,” and that “‘[u] nlike a clickwrap
agreement, a browsewrap agreement does not require the user to manifest assent to
the terms and conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead gives his assent simply by
using the website.’”) (quoting Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366–
67 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).

1122

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

Online users do not have to expressly consent to browsewrap terms,
as websites will typically interpret continued use of their services as
acceptance of the agreement.99
The plaintiffs in Specht downloaded SmartDownload software,
which Netscape owned.100 The plaintiffs then sued Netscape after
learning that the SmartDownload software surreptitiously gathered
their online data and transmitted it to Netscape.101 Netscape then
argued that the plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate these claims.102 In
support of its contention, Netscape pointed to the existence of an
arbitration provision in the SmartDownload browsewrap agreement,
which Netscape argued plaintiffs had accepted by using the
software.103
The court held that the plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration
provision because they did not have sufficient notice of its
existence.104 Judge Sotomayor, writing for the majority, observed that
SmartDownload users would have had to scroll down to the very
bottom of their computer screens in order to access the browsewrap
licensing agreement.105 Even if an Internet user did scroll down to the
bottom of the page, they would have only seen a hyperlink106 to the
browsewrap agreement, rather than the licensing agreement itself.107
Users would then have had to click on the hyperlink, located at the
bottom of the screen, to be directed to a separate webpage that
featured the licensing agreement and arbitration provision.108 Judge
Sotomayor concluded that a “reasonably prudent” Internet user
would not have had a basis for learning of or inquiring about the
existence of the arbitration provision.109 She determined that the
99. See id. (“[I]n a pure—form browsewrap agreement, ‘the website will contain a
notice that—by merely using the services of, obtaining information from, or initiating
applications within the website—the user is agreeing to and is bound by the site’s
terms of service’) (quoting Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F.Supp.2d 829, 837
(S.D.N.Y.2012)).
100. Specht, 306 F.3d at 21.
101. Id. at 21.
102. Id. at 25.
103. Id. at 24.
104. Id. at 28, 30 (finding “[c]larity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are
important in securing informed assent”).
105. Id. at 23.
106. A hyperlink is “a highlighted word or picture in a document or Web page that
you can click on with a computer mouse to go to another place in the same or a
different document or Web page.” See Hyperlink, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2016),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hyperlink [https://perma.cc/52PJ-42JA].
107. Specht, 306 F.3d at 23.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 30.
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plaintiffs never manifested their “unambiguous assent” to the
arbitration provision, as it was not sufficiently visible to them upon
installing SmartDownload.110 The plaintiffs had no knowledge of the
arbitration agreement, and therefore, did not have opportunity to
accept or reject its terms.111 Because the plaintiffs never assented to
the arbitration clause, their continued use of the SmartDownload
software could not be viewed as an objective showing of their
agreement.112
II. EXPLORING THE ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE LEGAL NOTICE
As discussed in Part I, principles of effective notice are critical to
FTC enforcement actions,113 state and federal statutes,114 and
enforceable contracts.115 Though notice is significant to many
different areas of U.S. law, it is of particular importance to legal
models that regulate commercial practices. This Part examines the
notice requirements of arbitration contracts in Part II.A, FDA
labeling rules in Part II.B, and FTC enforcement actions in Part II.C.
These three models respectively show standards of notice in
businesses contracts, highly regulated industries, and commercial
websites. Furthermore, this Part explores how these models define
effective notice, as well as the mechanisms each model has in place to
ensure that consumers are fairly apprised of material terms and risks.
A. Arbitration Clauses Viewed as Contracts: Actual and
Constructive Notice
As the Second Circuit demonstrated in Specht, a finding of
effective notice and mutual assent is essential to enforcing an
arbitration clause.116 Under federal law, courts are required to

110. Id. at 23, 29. (“[A]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his
consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is
unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not
obvious.”) (quoting Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr.
347, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). See also Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco
Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
111. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 20.
112. Id. at 28.
113. See, e.g., Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 5.
114. See Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 et seq. (West 2015); 12 C.F.R. § 573.1 (2015); 45 C.F.R. §
164.500 (2015).
115. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 32.
116. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 29.
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“rigorously enforce” the terms of arbitration agreements.117 The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) dictates that arbitration provisions
shall be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”118 This
law dictates that courts are to interpret arbitration provisions
according to general principles of contract doctrine.119 If the parties
mutually agreed to an arbitration clause in a contract, courts are
obliged to compel arbitration when future disputes fall within the
scope of that provision.120
Parties that arbitrate will often not be afforded procedural
protections from formal discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil

117. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“Th[e]
text [of the Federal Arbitration Act] reflects the overarching principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract. And consistent with that text, courts must
‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms.”) (quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
118. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The FAA evinces Congress’s greater aim to create a
“national policy favoring arbitration.” Southland Corp. v Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10
(1984). Granting arbitration provisions the status of binding contracts meant that
courts were required to enforce them upon a showing of parties’ valid agreement.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). The FAA’s
legislative history suggests that Congress enacted it in response to lasting judicial
hostility towards arbitration. Prior to the FAA, there was a long tradition of courts
refusing to enforce these provisions because it ousted them of jurisdiction. Preceding
the Act’s enactment, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee commented on
a lasting history, stemming from English Courts, of judicial hostility and suspicion
towards arbitration. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. V. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6
(1985) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924)).
119. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309. Arbitration clauses are often found
in the boilerplate language of standard form contracts. For example, Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), an organization that provides
arbitration and mediation services for different legal disputes, suggests this standard
language for an arbitration clause in domestic commercial contracts:
“Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof, including the
determination of the scope or applicability of this agreement to arbitrate, shall be
determined by arbitration in [insert the desired place of arbitration] before
[one/three] arbitrator(s) . . . Judgment on the Award may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction. This clause shall not preclude parties from seeking provisional
remedies in aid of arbitration from a court of appropriate jurisdiction.”

JAMS Clause Workbook: A Guide to Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses for
Commercial Contracts, JUD. ARB. & MEDIATION SERVICES (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.jamsadr.com/clauses/ [https://perma.cc/2T7U-LZLL].
120. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10 (“In enacting § 2 of the [F]ederal
[Arbitration] Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”).
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Procedure, or a jury.121 This is so because certain “fundamental”
rights, such as the right to a jury trial, are considered alienable.122
Parties are free to exchange negotiate these rights away by private
agreement.123 Standardized arbitration clauses in form contracts
provide a mechanism through which parties trade their right to a jury
for consideration.124 In the employment arbitration agreements, for
example, courts have identified employers’ promises to hire new
employees as consideration to support an arbitration provision in an
employee contract.125
Without evidence of parties’ prior agreement, courts will refuse to
enforce arbitration clauses.126 This is because one party may not
coerce another into arbitration.127 Rather, parties must mutually
assent to arbitrate and forgo their use of the judicial forum.128
Application of common law contract principles reveals that notice is a
critical aspect of this mutual assent.129 Formation of a valid contract
requires offer and acceptance.130 Acceptance is inferred from context
if an offeree receives notice of the offer and agrees or manifests

121. See Teresa Snider, The Discovery Powers of Arbitrators and Federal Courts
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 101, 109 (1998) (“In addition
to refusing to maintain jurisdiction over an arbitrable action for purposes of
discovery, courts have also refused to apply the discovery procedures in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to arbitrations where the parties have not contractually
provided for those provisions to apply.”). See also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration

Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional
Rights, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169 (2004).
122. Ware, supra note 121, at 169.
123. See Ware, supra note 121, at 169 (“One way to alienate the jury-trial right is
to consent to a contract containing an arbitration clause . . . .).
124. See Martindale v. Sandvik, 173 N.J. 76, 89 (2002).
125. See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 368 (7th Cir.
1999). Courts have also held that the continued employment of at-will employees
also constitutes sufficient consideration for an agreement to arbitrate. See Durkin v.
CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481, 488 (D. Kan. 1996).
126. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297 (2010) (“A
court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied
that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”) (emphasis in original). See also
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974).
127. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989)
(“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of consent, not
coercion . . . .”).
128. See Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 297.
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONDUCT AS MANIFESTATION
OF ASSENT § 19(2) (1981).
130. Fiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“The basic
requirements for a contract include offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of
the minds of the contracting parties.”).
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agreement to the offer.131 Common law concepts of offer and
acceptance thereby inherently implicate notice, for without notice of
an offer, a party cannot meaningfully assent to its terms.132
Though notice of an offer is necessary for assent, courts do not
require that parties receive actual notice of an arbitration clause.133
When a party receives “actual notice,” that notice is directly or
personally conveyed to them.134 In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, the Supreme Court struck down a Montana statute that
was enacted to facilitate contacting parties’ actual notice of
arbitration clauses.135 The Montana law required that on the first
page of contracts subject to arbitration there be a notice statement
that the contract was subject to arbitration, and that the statement be
in capital and underlined letters.136 Arbitration clauses could be
considered invalid under this state law if they did not meet the notice
requirements.137 A Montana lower court upheld the special notice
requirement, interpreting the law to require that “before arbitration
agreements [be considered] enforceable, they be entered
knowingly.”138
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted the
Montana statute due to its special notice requirements.139 The Court
held that states could not enact laws that singled out arbitration
agreements by outlining unique grounds for invalidating them.140 The
FAA instructed, as the court held, that arbitration agreements must
have contract status, and they therefore could be vacated solely on
contract grounds such as fraud or duress.141 The Court reasoned that
creating new ways to vacate arbitration undermined Congress’ intent

131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONDUCT AS MANIFESTATION
§ 19(2)
132. See Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration,
44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 435 (2006).
133. See id. at 436; see generally Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996) (invalidating a Montana law which required notice of arbitration to be printed
in “underlined capital letters on the first page of [a] contract”).
134. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “actual notice” as “[n]otice given directly to,
or received personally by, a party.” Notice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
135. See Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. at 685.
136. See id. at 684.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 685.
139. Id. at 688.
140. Id. at 687 (“Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under
state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”) (emphasis in original).
141. Id.
OF ASSENT
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to put arbitration agreements upon the “same footing as other
contracts.”142
Because courts put arbitration agreements “on equal footing” with
contracts, parties need not receive actual notice to be bound by their
terms.143 As in common law contracts, parties’ constructive notice will
often suffice to render arbitration agreements enforceable.144 A party
receives “constructive notice” of an agreement when, given the
specific facts or circumstance, a party had reason to know that certain
terms existed and had the duty to apprise themselves of those
terms.145 The requisites of constructive notice are outlined in F.D.
Import & Export Corporation v. M/V REEFER SUN.146 In that case,
the court determined that F.D. Import, a large commercial buyer of
international fruit, was compelled to arbitrate with various suppliers
and carriers.147 Though F.D. Import had no actual notice of the
clause, the court held that it had received constructive notice, which
was enough to compel arbitration.148 The court found that F.D.
Import had constructive notice of the arbitration clause, despite the
142. Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). But see
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 1998 MT 326, ¶ 23 (1998) (holding that “[t]he
FAA generally preempts state law which restricts the application of arbitration
agreements. However, when a state law does not conflict with the FAA so as to
frustrate the objectives of Congress, it is not necessarily preempted. State law may be
applied in spite of the FAA’s preemptive effect “if that law arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally”)
(quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93, n.9 (1987)). See also Wells v. Tenn.
Homesafe Inspections, LLC, No. M200800224-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 5234724, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because
it was not separately signed or initialed by both parties, as required by state law).
143. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996). See also Bales, supra note 132, at 424.
144. See Steel Warehouse Co. v. Abalone Shipping Ltd. of Nicosai, 141 F.3d 234,
237 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that parties were bound by an arbitration clause because
they had constructive notice that it was incorporated into their agreement); F.D. Imp.
& Exp. Corp. v. M/V REEFER SUN, 248 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A
party does not need actual notice to be bound by an arbitration agreement.
Constructive notice is sufficient to create a binding arbitration agreement.”).
145. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “constructive notice” as “[n]otice arising by
presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a
duty to take notice of, such as a registered deed or a pending lawsuit; notice
presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that
person.” Notice, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See also Steel Warehouse,
141 F.3d at 237. (“Constructive notice can be defined, crudely, as a rule in which ‘if
you should have known something, you’ll be held responsible for what you should
have known.’”).
146. 248 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
147. Id. at 251.
148. Id. at 248.
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fact that F.D. Import was never a signatory of the contract in which
the arbitration clause appeared.149 Though only the ship owner and
charterer signed the agreement, it was later incorporated into
subsequent bills of lading.150 The reverse side of the bills of lading
stated that it incorporated all terms of the previous contract, including
the arbitration clause.151 The court held that the bill of lading was
sufficient to place F.D. Import on constructive notice and to compel
arbitration.152

1. Contract Remedies for Insufficient Notice of Arbitration Clauses
Though parties are not entitled to actual notice of arbitration,
common law contract remedies may provide redress when notice of
an arbitration clause is insufficient.153 Courts should not presume that
parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute “unless there is ‘clea[r] and
unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”154 A court’s determination
of whether a dispute should be moved to arbitration depends on
whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate and whether the
dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.155 Nevertheless,
parties may prevail in vacating an arbitration clause through a
showing of insufficient notice.156 Parties may argue that without being
offered fair notice of an arbitration clause, they could not manifest
requisite consent to this contract term.157

149. Id. at 247-48.
150. Id. A “bill of lading” is defined as a “document acknowledging the receipt of
goods by a carrier or by the shipper’s agent and the contract for the transportation of
those goods; a document that indicates the receipt of goods for shipment and that is
issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods.” Bill
of Lading, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
151. F.D. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
152. Id.
153. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding
that when an arbitration clause is valid, an arbitrator, rather than a court, has the
deciding power over parties’ disputes). But see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local 8-766, Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 600 F.2d 322, 324-25 (1st Cir. 1979) (providing
that a court must hear questions of arbitrability, or the threshold issue of whether or
not an arbitration clause is enforceable).
154. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (citing AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Comm’ns.
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)) (alteration in original).
155. See First Options of Chi., Inc., 514 U.S. at 944-45.
156. See Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147
n.3 (D. Mass. 2004) (“[A]n employee’s knowledge of the [employer’s] offer is
obviously a necessity for the inference of acceptance to hold.”); see Bales, supra note
132, at 436-37.
157. See Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 555 (1st
Cir. 2005).
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Contract defenses of unconscionability encompass underlying
claims of insufficient notice and defective consent.158 In contract law,
the doctrine of unconscionability consists of two branches: procedural
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.159 Though both
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present to
invalidate an agreement, and the more one is shown, the less the
other is needed.160 Contracts that are substantively unconscionable
tend to have unduly harsh or unreasonable terms.161 Agreements that
are procedurally unconscionable, on the other hand, tend to be
formed under unjust conditions, such as when one party has
disproportionate bargaining power or fails to apprise an offeree of the
contract’s terms.162 A showing of lack of notice and “surprise” is
sometimes inherent to a procedural unconscionability analysis.163
“Surprise” may occur when “supposedly agreed-upon terms of the
bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party
seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”164
A court may refuse to enforce a “surprise” arbitration clause if it
was either buried in an agreement, or not sufficiently called to a
party’s attention during the formation of a contract.165 For example,
in Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., the court held that an
arbitration clause was one of surprise because it was inconspicuously
included in the twentieth paragraph of the twenty-three paragraph
long agreement.166 The court noted that there was no separate
signature in the contract for the arbitration clause, and the signature
line was on an entirely separate page.167 Moreover, the arbitration

158. See Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (N.D. Cal.
2013).
159. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 36 Cal. 4th 148, 160 (2005);
Unconscionability, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
160. See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 579 (2007).
161. Unconscionability, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
162. Id.
163. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To
determine whether the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable the
court must examine ‘the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the
circumstances of the parties at that time.’ An inquiry into whether [an] arbitration
agreement involves oppression or surprise is central to that analysis.”) (quoting
Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1329 (1999)).
164. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Ct. App. 1982).
165. See Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL
370557, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (finding surprise because an arbitration clause
was not separated from the rest of the page and was not on the page that required
agreeing parties’ signatures).
166. 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
167. Id.
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clause was neither highlighted nor outlined on the page in order to
stand out to the reader.168 Thus, the court held that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable on the grounds of unfair surprise.169
Arbitration clauses may also be unconscionable when a drafting
party reserves the right to change the terms of arbitration without
notice.170 In Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit
held that an arbitration clause in an employment contract was
unconscionable because it reserved the right of employer, Hooters of
America Inc. (“Hooters”), to unilaterally modify the arbitration
terms in the post-agreement stage.171 According to its contract terms,
Hooters could modify the rules of employee arbitration “in whole or
in part,” whenever it wished, “without notice” to the employee.172
Further, Hooters reserved the right to expand the scope of an
employee arbitration to cover matters not already listed in the initial
arbitration agreement, whether or not it related to an employee’s
initial claim.173 Because Hooters maintained the right to change the
terms of arbitration agreements as it wished, the court held that the
arbitration agreement was one-sided and unenforceable.174 The
ability to modify arbitration terms in the post-agreement stage,
without apprising employees with notice, impermissibly allowed
Hooters to dominate arbitration outcomes.175

168. Id. Note that the district court’s holding in Zaborowski rests alongside the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996),
because in Doctor’s Associates, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that
specifically demanded special notice requirements for arbitration clauses. The FAA
made no such demands, and federal law therefore preempted the state law. In
Zaborowski, however, the district court found that an agreement was procedurally
unconscionable under common law contract grounds, as its terms were visibly
inconspicuous to the agreeing party.
169. See Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
170. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939, 941 (4th Cir. 1999). A
contract has also been found to be invalid due to lack of acceptance when one party
unilaterally modifies a contract. See Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of
Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Indeed, a party can’t unilaterally change
the terms of a contract; it must obtain the other party’s consent before doing so. This
is because a revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the parties until it is
accepted.”).
171. 173 F.3d at 939, 941.
172. Id. at 939.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 941.
175. Id. (“By promulgating this system of warped rules, Hooters so skewed the
process in its favor that [plaintiff] has been denied arbitration in any meaningful
sense of the word. To uphold the promulgation of this aberrational scheme under the
heading of arbitration would undermine, not advance, the federal policy favoring
alternative dispute resolution. This we refuse to do.”).
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2. Arbitration Clauses Viewed as Waivers: The “Voluntary and
Knowing” Standard
Some federal courts equate arbitration provisions with waivers of
legal rights.176 When parties agree to arbitrate, these courts argue,
they waive certain legal rights by default.177 The agreeing parties lose
access to the traditional judicial forum for their dispute.178 Instead of
a judge and jury, one or more arbitrators determine the outcome of a
case.179 Arbitrators are not bound by the same rules and procedures
as judges, and they do not have to comply with the Rules of Civil
Procedure or Rules of Evidence during the arbitration.180 Moreover,
fact-finding in arbitration proceedings is less thorough and more
limited than that in the judicial setting.181 Fact-finding in arbitration
need not include sworn testimony, cross-examination, or discovery.182
In addition to waiving the right to a jury trial, parties to an
arbitration agreement relinquish other procedural and substantive
protections. For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court determined that
arbitration procedures are capable of vindicating parties’ federal
statutory rights.183 It held that parties are free to stipulate that an
arbitrator will have deciding power over federal statutory claims, and

176. See Bales, supra note 132, at 449; Christine M. Reilly, Comment, Achieving
Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1210 (2002).
177. Among these rights is the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. U.S.
CONST. amend VII. See RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813
(N.D. Tex. 2002). The right to a jury trial also depends on the type of legal
proceeding involved. In administrative hearings, for example, there is no right to a
jury trial. See Ware, supra note 121, at 169.
178. See Reilly, supra note 176, at 1211.
179. See Reilly, supra note 176, at 1210.
180. See Reilly, supra note 176, at 1210.
181. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (“[T]he
factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. The
record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of
evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as
discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are
often severely limited or unavailable.”).
182. Id. at 57-58.
183. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638,
(1985). Since Mitsubishi,
the Supreme Court has held that claims arising under federal statutes such as antitrust laws, securities law, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
are appropriate for arbitration. See generally Richard E. Speidel, Consumer

Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived
Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998).
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are free to stipulate if that arbitrator should apply federal law.184 The
Court noted that parties have the freedom to determine the scope and
procedure of their own arbitration agreements.185 It concluded that
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” a federal statute may
“continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”186
The Supreme Court held that arbitration provisions do not prevent
individuals from asserting statutory rights.187 Nonetheless, some
circuit courts require proof of parties’ “knowing” waiver of their legal
rights before enforcing arbitration agreements.188 The Ninth189 and
Sixth Circuits,190 for instance, have expressly adopted the “knowing”
agreement waiver standard, while courts in the Seventh Circuit have
endorsed it.191 Courts in these Circuits require proof of parties’
informed consent to waiving constitutional or statutory rights prior to
compelling arbitration.192 Under this standard, parties cannot agree to
arbitrate and lose access to a judicial forum without receiving explicit
notice of the constitutional or statutory rights that they may be
signing away.193

184. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (“Nothing . . . prevents a party from
excluding statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to arbitrate.”).
185. Id. at 628.
186. Id. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-28
(1991) (holding that an employee’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
are appropriate for arbitration because Congress did not intend to exclude
arbitration as a form of dispute resolution under the statute).
187. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
188. See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir.
2005); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 2005). In the
context of criminal law, defendants must “knowingly and intelligently” relinquish
their Fifth Amendment due process rights in order for waiver to be valid. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
189. See Lindgren v. Pub. Storage, 290 Fed. Appx. 971, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing
Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997)).
190. The Sixth Circuit has articulated a test for assessing the validity of parties’
waivers. The court evaluates whether parties knowingly and voluntarily waived their
rights according to “(1) plaintiff’s experience, background, and education; (2) the
amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including
whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of
the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the
circumstances.” See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (2003)
(quoting Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 )6th Cir. 1995)).
191. See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir.
1997); see also Bales, supra note 132, at 449-50.
192. See Walker., 400 F.3d at 380.
193. See Tanya J. Axenson, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Statutory Rights:

The Legal Landscape After Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corporation, 119 F.3d
756 (1997), 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 271, 281-82 (1998).
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The Ninth Circuit described the core requirements of the
“knowing” agreement standard in Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper
Corp.194 In Nelson, the court applied the “knowing” agreement
standard and held that an employee could not be compelled to
arbitrate his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim.195 The
appellant’s employer in Nelson gave him an employee handbook that
contained an arbitration provision.196 After receiving the handbook,
the appellant returned a form to his employer that stated that he
agreed to “read and understand” the handbook.197 A year after the
appellant received the employee handbook, he was terminated from
his position, and filed a claim alleging discrimination under the ADA
against his former employer in federal court.198 The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant employer, upholding
the arbitration agreement in the Employee Handbook.199
The Ninth Circuit determined that the arbitration clause was not
enforceable because the appellant did not knowingly agree to waive
his statutory rights.200 Examining the history and language of the
ADA, the court determined that Congress intended that employees
knowingly consent prior to waiving their ADA rights, protections,
and remedies.201 Furthermore, the court held that though the
appellant agreed to “read and understand” the handbook, he did not
agree to be bound by its terms.202 Neither the appellant’s employer
nor the handbook informed the appellant that his agreement to “read
and understand” his employer’s terms would translate to a waiver of
his statutory civil rights.203
Finally, the Nelson court held that continued employment was not
enough to put the appellant on notice that he had waived his statutory
rights.204 Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded that when employees

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997).

Id. 762.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 762. The Nelson court aligned with a prior Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994), which held that
employees did not consent to arbitrate their Title VII sexual harassment claims
because they did not do so “knowingly.” The Lai court determined that the
plaintiffs’ employee registration forms failed to notify them that future sexual
discrimination claims in particular would be subject to arbitration. Id.
201. Nelson, 119 F.3d at 761 n.9.
202. Id. at 761.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 762.
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bargain to waive their rights to a judicial forum, they must waive
those rights in an express and explicit manner.205 The ”unilateral
promulgation by an employer of arbitration provisions” in the
employee handbook failed to meet the standard of a “knowing”
waiver of ADA protections.206 The court determined that to arbitrate
statutory claims, employers must inform employees of the existence
of arbitration clauses and specifically refer to the rights that
employees will waive if they agree to them.207 Otherwise, arbitration
agreements would be unenforceable, as employees would
unknowingly surrender their guaranteed statutory privileges and
remedies.208
B. FDA Labeling Rules
Notice is critical in the domain of arbitration clauses and
commercial contracts.
Proof that parties were on actual or
constructive notice of an arbitration agreement may evince their
consent to arbitrate future disputes and waive their access to a judicial
forum. Similarly, notice is critical to ensuring consumer safety in
highly regulated industries.209 The FDA regulates how OTC drug
manufacturers convey notice to consumers.210 Through its OTC druglabeling rule, the FDA uses product packaging as a mechanism for
effective notice.211 The FDA regulates the content and format of
OTC drug labels with standardized requirements so that labels are
readable and rapidly inform consumers of pertinent drug
information.212 This Note ultimately argues that if some features of
OTC drug labels were to be extrapolated and applied to online
privacy policies, then online privacy polices might become more
legible and digestible to the average consumer.

205. Id. at 762 (“Any bargain to waive the right to a judicial forum for civil rights
claims, including those covered by the ADA, in exchange for employment or
continued employment must at the least be express: the choice must be explicitly
presented to the employee and the employee must explicitly agree to waive the
specific right in question. That did not occur in the case before us.”).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 762.
208. See Axenson, supra note 193, at 282.
209. See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know”
from the “Need to Know’ About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
293, 321 (1994) (discussing required warnings on FDA regulated drug products).
210. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 (2014).
211. See Noah, supra note 209, at 320-21.
212. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66
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1. Standardized Content in FDA Labeling Rules
Though different courts have unique standards of notice, the
FDA’s notice requirements for OTC drug labels are highly uniform
and regulated.213 In 1999, the FDA published a final regulation that
established standardized labeling requirements for OTC drugs.214 The
regulation detailed both the content and format of OTC drug labels,
and set forth a general product-labeling outline for presenting drug
information to consumers.215 Prior to the rule, the FDA found that
variations between OTC drug products in areas of label content (i.e.,
differences in wording of drug warnings and directions for use) and
label format (i.e., differences in headings and typeface) increased
consumer confusion over similar OTC drugs on the market.216
Because manufacturers presented product information differently,
consumers had difficulty comparing drugs and deciding which were
most appropriate for their needs.217
The 1999 rule aimed to improve OTC labeling by dictating
requirements for drug label format.218 The rule requires warnings to
be conveyed in the form of short, directive statements.219 For
example, when an OTC drug might be dangerous to children, the
FDA provides that a manufacturer display in bold type “[k]eep out of
reach of children” and “‘[a]sk a doctor before use if the child
has’ . . . all warnings for persons with certain preexisting
conditions . . . and all warnings for persons experiencing certain
symptoms.”220 The FDA determined that drug warnings in the form
of curt and action-oriented commands would be more readable,
direct, and understandable to consumers.221 The FDA asserted that
these brief directives would enhance warning clarity by conveying to
consumers the precise course of action they should take for safe
product use.222 The FDA found that, unlike densely worded text,
shorter sentences with simple terminology reduced consumers’

213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d).
216. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Proposed Labeling Requirements, 62
Fed. Reg. 9024, 9027 (Feb. 27, 1997).
217. See id. at 9028.
218. See id. at 9027-28.
219. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66.
220. 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(c)(5)(iv), (x).
221. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg.
13254, 13254 (Mar. 17, 1999).
222. See id. at 13254-55.
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processing time.223 With less text on a label, consumers would not be
overwhelmed with information and would be able to read and
understand labels at faster rates.224
This rule prescribed the content of OTC drug labels and the
sequence in which that content must be conveyed.225 It required that
an OTC drug label display information under the headings in the
exact sequence of “active ingredients,” “uses,” “warnings,”
“directions,” and “inactive ingredients.”226 The FDA determined that
by requiring manufacturers to present content in this uniform order,
consumers would become familiar with this routine sequence and
know where to find a specific drug fact on any given OTC label.227 By
organizing drug facts in a formulaic and uniform scheme, drug labels
could shape consumer expectations for what information they could
find on a label and where on the label they could locate it.228 The
FDA concluded that standardizing the sequence of drug label content
would enable consumers to accurately compare different brands of
OTC drug products.229 A uniform order of label content enabled
consumers to perform side-by-side comparisons, identify differences
between products, and readily determine which products were safest
for use.230

2. User-friendly Formatting
Prior to the 1999 rule, the FDA discovered that some common
formatting practices diminished the legibility of OTC drug labels.231
The FDA observed that labels with compressed text and small type
letters contributed to consumer comprehension problems.232 The
FDA concluded that such labels required consumers to possess a
greater than normal visual acuity in order to read and understand
displayed product information.233 Additionally, the FDA determined
that even if consumers could see the information on drug labels,

223. Id. at 13255.
224. Id.
225. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(c) (2014).
226. Id.
227. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg.
at 13255.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 13277.
231. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Proposed Labeling Requirements, 62
Fed. Reg. 9024, 9027-28 (Feb. 27, 1997).
232. Id.
233. Id.
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compressed paragraphs of text caused consumers to lose interest in
the information presented.234
The 1999 rule required OTC drug label content to be displayed in a
tabular outline.235 Within this outline, the FDA requires drug
manufacturers to describe drug information in shorter phrases under
standardized, bold-type title headings.236 As opposed to displaying
paragraphs of text, the rule requires drug manufactures to “chunk”
similar groups of information together on the label.237
This
“chunked” format entailed separating discrete units of related label
information (i.e., drug warnings, drug directions, active ingredients) in
list form.238 The FDA determined that organizing label information in
a chunked structure improved consumers’ reading and processing
abilities.239
Using simpler terminology, shorter sentences, and
conspicuous headings tended to reduce consumers’ “cognitive load”
by creating less demand on consumers’ memories.240 Finally, the
FDA concluded that in comparison to paragraphs, the chunked
format had greater eye appeal and was more likely to draw
consumers’ attention to the information presented.241
User-friendly titles, headings, and subheadings are a central aspect
of the 1999 FDA rule.242 These formatting elements advance the
FDA’s overarching aim to make information easier to locate and

234. Id. at 9028.
235. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg.
at 13265-66.
236. Id. at 13265.
237. Id. at 13255.
238. Id. at 13265-66.
239. Id. at 13255. See generally Michael S. Wogalter & Mica P. Post, Printed

Tutorial Instructions: Effects Of Text Format And Screen Pictographs On HumanComputer Task Performance, 89 PROCEED. INTERFACE 133 (1989) (finding that when
shown information in the form of paragraph and lists with screen pictographs,
participants in a study made fewer errors and help requests, and completed tasks in
shorter time when shown lists); Lawrence T. Frase & Bary J. Schwartz,
Typographical Cues That Facilitate Comprehension, 71 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 197,
204-05 (1979) (finding that grouping information facilitates readers’ search for
information as well as their acquisition of knowledge); William J. Vigilante, Jr. &
Michael S. Wogalter, Over-The-Counter (OTC) Drug Labeling: Format Preferences,
PROCEED. HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOC’Y 43RD ANN. MEETING 104 (1999),
http://www.safetyhumanfactors.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/163Vigilante_Wogalter1999.pd
[https://perma.cc/6YF2CT5T] (stating that chunking information into groups can foster improved reading
comprehension).
240. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at
13255.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 13254.
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read.243 Titles and headings provide consumers with “visual cues” that
could draw their eyes to important categories of information on a
drug label.244 To enhance uniform compliance with its headings
regulations, the FDA provides specific and detailed requirements in
the rule.245 For example, the rule requires that headings be displayed
in bold italic type and subheadings displayed in bold type.246
The 1999 rule also regulates the size of typeface on OTC drug
labels.247 Prior to the rule, the FDA found that labels were cramped
and difficult for many consumers to read.248 It concluded that small
type, text-heavy labels demanded a greater than normal visual acuity
from consumers.249 Moreover, the FDA found that only forty-eight
percent of the population could see the typical type size of label
text.250 To improve the legibility of OTC labels, the FDA prescribes
that the letter height or type size for subheadings and all other
information should be no smaller than 6-point type.251 According to
the FDA, this larger type size improves much of the general
population’s ability to physically see the text on product labels.252
Increased visibility also improves consumers’ reading and

243. See id.
244. Id.
245. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(5)-(6) (2014).
246. 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(3).
247. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.66(d)(2), (4), (10)(ii).
248. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Proposed Labeling Requirements, 62
Fed. Reg. 9024, 9024 (Feb. 27, 1997).
249. See id. at 9028. To support its proposal, the Administration cited a study that
explored “the effects of type size (vertical letter height) and horizontal letter
compression” on the legibility of OTC drug labels among the geriatric population and
found that “a significant number of the elderly population could not adequately see
the print on certain OTC product labels due in part to the small type sizes and high
degree of horizontal compression. Id. (citing Richard K. Watanabe, The Ability of

the Geriatric Population to Read Labels on Over-the-Counter Medication
Containers, J. THE AM. OPTOMETRIC ASS’N., 65:32-37 (1994)). The Administration
also cited another study, which “evaluated the visual acuity needed to read 25
marketed OTC drug product labels” and found that the majority of labels demanded
a much higher than normal visual acuity. Id. (citing Greg A. Holt et al., OTC Labels:
Can Consumers Read and Understand Them?, AM. PHARMACY, NS30:51-54 (1989)).
250. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at
13265 (explaining that prior to the rule, the National Drug Manufactures Association
recommended a minimum type size of 4.5, which the FDA found that only 48% of
the public could actually read). See also Vigilante & Wogalter, supra note 239, at 104
(asserting that people are less likely to expend the mental energy on reading
information on densely printed labels).
251. 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(2).
252. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at
13264.
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comprehension of product labels.253 The FDA determined that when
consumers are more confident about their ability to read a product
label, they are more capable of processing and understanding that
label’s information.254

3. Symbolic Visual Cues
The FDA endorses the use of symbolic cues on OTC labels as a
means of conveying information.255 For example, the FDA affirms
that bullet points could be used to introduce “chunks” of information
without distracting or confusing consumers.256 By separating drug
facts into discrete chunks, bullets on OTC drug labels convey key
information without overwhelming consumers.257 An FDA guidance
document explains how bullets may be used on drug labels.258 The
guidance document states that drug labels should list separate
statements under bullets, rather than consolidating the statements
into longer paragraphs.259 For example, instead of presenting user
directions in a large block of text, the guidance document states that
phrases such as “shake well” and “children under 2 years: ask a
doctor” may be positioned under bullets in an easier to read format.260
The FDA permits, but does not require, OTC drug manufacturers
to communicate drug information through pictograms.261 The FDA
defines a “pictogram” as “a pictorial representation of some object
used to symbolize information.”262 The FDA also provides for the use
of pictograms outside of the OTC drug context.263 For instance, the
Administration requires that powdered infant formula manufacturers
display pictures to represent the three-step process involved in safely
preparing and using the product.264 It determined that pictures, rather
than words, would enhance the clarity of the preparation
253. See id. at 13254.
254. See id. at 13257.
255. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(4).
256. Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at
13266. The FDA defines “bullet” as a “geometric symbol,” either a solid square or
circle, “that precedes each statement in a list of statements.” 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(d)(4).
257. See Over-The-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg.
at 13266.
258. See Guidance For Industry Labeling OTC Human Drug Products (Small
Entity Compliance Guide), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 2009 WL 1887337 (May 2009).
259. Id. at *5.
260. Id. at *9.
261. Id. at *11.
262. Id.
263. See 21 C.F.R. § 107.20 (2014).
264. Id.
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instructions.265 The FDA further recognized that many caregivers and
health professionals might not be able to speak or read English.266
Showing the product directions via images would reach a wider
audience and help ensure that consumers could properly dilute the
formula regardless of reading level.267
C. FTC Enforcement Actions
Like the FDA, the FTC exercises its administrative authority to
regulate notice in the commercial domain.268 FTC enforcement
actions have shaped the contours of U.S. privacy law, and inform
legal standards of notice in the present digital age.269 While
identifying the different categories of FTC Section 5 privacy actions,
this Note relies on the typology of underlying privacy harms
developed by the Fordham Law Center for Law and Information
Policy (CLIP).270 CLIP has categorized FTC actions according to the
most frequently asserted privacy harms in FTC complaints271 and
classified FTC actions as relating to four distinct privacy harms: (1)
unauthorized disclosure of personal information, discussed in Part
II.C.1;272 (2) surreptitious collection of personal information,
discussed in Part II.C.2;273 (3) failure to secure personal information,
discussed in Part II.C.3;274 and (4) unlawful retention of personal
information, discussed in Part II.C.4.275

265. See Infant Formula; Labeling Requirements, 48 Fed. Reg. 31880-01, 31883
(July 12, 1983).
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 585-86 (asserting that FTC privacy
actions provide a basis for modern U.S. privacy jurisprudence).
269. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 606 (“The FTC has essentially been
inching itself into the role of a de facto federal data protection authority).
270. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 20.
271. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 20. Due to the fact that the FTC can
only act pursuant to its statutory authority, enforcement actions must “fit” within the
scope of Section 5’s statutory language of an “unfair” or “deceptive” practice. In its
study, CLIP looked beyond FTC’s characterizations of certain practices as “unfair”
or “deceptive” and studied the underlying privacy harms asserted in the
Commission’s complaints. CLIP explained that “[t]his approach looked to the true
substance of the wrongful event rather than the way a claim was formulated to fit
within the existing constraints of the legal landscape.” Reidenberg, et al., supra note
47, at 20.
272. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 21.
273. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 22.
274. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 23.
275. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 24.
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1. Unauthorized Disclosure of Personal Information
Under the “unauthorized disclosure” class of FTC actions, websites
disclose users’ personal information to third parties without first
notifying users or obtaining their consent.276 An unauthorized
disclosure occurs either when a consumer is not notified that his or
her data is shared with a third party, or when a consumer is misled
about how or for what purposes his or her data is collected.277 The
FTC Complaint for In re GeoCities, demonstrates the privacy harms
that may result from unauthorized disclosures.278 In this action, the
FTC determined that GeoCities committed a “deceptive practice”
because it misrepresented its data collection and sharing practices to
consumers.279
GeoCities hosted different web pages that provided its members
with personal home pages, email addresses, and online children’s
clubs.280 The GeoCities membership form collected “mandatory”
information, including first and last name, zip code, e-mail address,
gender, date of birth, and “optional” information, such as education
level, income, marital status, occupation, and interests.281 Geocities
users could also opt to receive “special offers” from other
companies.282 Though the Geocities privacy statement claimed, “[w]e
assure you . . . we will NEVER give your personal information to
anyone without your permission,” the company actually disclosed,
rented, and sold users’ personally identifiable information to third
party advertisers for the purposes of targeted advertising.283 The
shared information also included data that GeoCities collected from
children.284 The FTC determined that by failing to notify members
regarding how it collected and shared personal data with advertisers,
GeoCities committed a Section 5 deceptive practice.285 Beyond its
failure to disclose the nature of its data collection and sharing,
GeoCites actively misled consumers with its privacy statements,

276. See e.g., Frostwire Complaint, supra note 65; HTC America Complaint, supra
note 65; Red Zone Complaint, supra note 65.
277. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 21-22.
278. See generally Complaint, In re GeoCities, FTC File No. 9823015, No. C-3850
(F.T.C. Feb. 5, 1999).
279. Id. at 2-5.
280. Id. at 1.
281. Id. at 2.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 3.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 4-5.
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which stated that personal data would not be transmitted to third
parties without users’ consent. 286
The FTC has also filed complaints against companies that failed to
apprise consumers of how personal data was appropriated.287 In In re
Facebook, Inc., the FTC filed a complaint against Facebook for
failing to disclose how it used its members’ personal profile
information.288 According to the FTC complaint, Facebook claimed
that it never shared users’ personal data with advertisers without their
consent,289 but stated that it only shared “aggregate and anonymous
data” with advertisers so that Facebook’s advertisers could generate
more effective advertisements.290
The FTC also found that Facebook failed to notify consumers of
material privacy policy changes that increased the visibility of users’
personal information to third parties.291 Under its new privacy policy,
Facebook retroactively applied changes to members’ accounts
without their consent and disclosed parts of Facebook profiles that
were formerly under privacy settings.292 As with GeoCities, the FTC
determined that this lack of disclosure constituted a Section 5
deceptive practice.293 By failing to disclose its practices, Facebook
promoted false expectations of privacy among its members.294

2. Surreptitious Collection of Personal Information
The FTC has also filed complaints against companies for failing to
inform consumers when and how they collect personal data.295
Sometimes, websites that surreptitiously collect personal data
partially disclose their collection practices to users.296 However, such
disclosures may be inadequate when websites fail to notify users of
the true scope of the information they collect, or how they acquire
286. See id. at 3.
287. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 21-22.
288. See generally Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 0923184, No. C4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012).
289. Id. at 12.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 9.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 19.
294. See id. at 14.
295. See, e.g., In re Aspen Way Complaint, supra note 67 (collecting user data by
remotely operating website users’ webcams on their personal computers); In re Epic
Marketplace, Inc. Complaint, supra note 67 (collecting users data by tracking their
browsing histories).
296. See, e.g., Complaint at 5, United States v. In re Path, Inc., F.T.C. File No.
1223158 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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that information.297 For example, in In re Upromise, Inc., Upromise,
an online service that offered college savings to members,
clandestinely collected users’ data through its downloadable
“Turbosaver Toolbar.”298 Upromise stated to users that the Toolbar
collected information about websites that they visited in order to
present savings opportunities tailored to their interests.299
The FTC determined that the Toolbar’s data collection practices
went beyond the scope of what Upromise disclosed to users.300 The
FTC found that the Toolbar collected users’ passwords and
usernames, information about every website they visited, and the
links that they clicked.301 The Toolbar also collected information
from users’ interactions on secured webpages such as banks and
online retailers.302 As a result, the Toolbar gathered users’ financial
account numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers, and
security codes.303 The FTC found that without special software, or
technical expertise, consumers had no means of discovering
Upromise’s true data collection practices.304 The FTC concluded that
Upromise’s data collection constituted an unfair practice.305 The true
nature of Upromise’s collection practices, which included gathering
sensitive financial data, actually put users at risk for identity theft and
other consumer harms.306
In a later enforcement action, In re ScanScout, the FTC articulated
concrete standards for enhancing consumer notice of data collection
practices.307 The FTC initially filed the complaint against the video
advertising network ScanScout due to its use of HTTP cookies.308
ScanScout stated that consumers could “opt-out” of receiving cookies

297. Id. at 9.
298. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2. A “toolbar” is “a row of buttons on
a display screen that are clicked on to select various functions in a software
application
or
web
browser.”
Toolbar, DICTIONARY.COM (2016),
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/toolbar [https://perma.cc/UX3N-Y33N].
299. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2.
300. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 5.
301. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2.
302. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2-3.
303. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 3.
304. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 2.
305. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 6.
306. Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 3.
307. See Complaint at 2, In re ScanScout, Inc., File No. 102-3185, No. C-4344
(F.T.C. Dec. 14, 2011).
308. See id. (providing “HTTP cookies . . . are small text files that can be used to
collect and store information about a user’s online activities”).
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by changing their browser settings.309 Nonetheless, flash cookies,
which were stored in a unique location on consumers’ computers,
could not be deleted in this way.310 The FTC determined that
ScanScout violated Section 5 for making false and misleading
statements to consumers.311
In the ScanScout decision and order, the FTC described how
consumers should be apprised of the choice to opt-out of data
collection practices.312 The FTC ordered ScanScout to place a “clear
and prominent notice” on its homepage that disclosed that it collected
consumer data through targeted advertising.313 Next to the disclosure,
the FTC required ScanScout to include a link that consumers could
click on to opt-out of the data collection.314 The order provided that
the link should lead consumers directly to a “clearly and prominently
disclosed mechanism” that consumers could use to prevent future
data collection.315
In the order, the FTC included a definition of “clearly and
prominently.”316 It determined that “clear and prominent” disclosures
are in a “type, size, and location sufficiently noticeable for an
ordinary consumer to comprehend and read.”317 According to the
FTC, the statements should also be in a print that “contrasts highly
with the background on which they appear.”318 Additionally, the FTC
stated that “in all instances,” required disclosures must be presented
in an “understandable language and syntax,” not contradicted by any
other statements.319 By requiring ScanScout to be direct about its
targeted advertising practices, the FTC sought to prevent future
privacy harms caused by covert collections of consumer data.

309. Id.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 3.
312. Decision and Order at 4, In re ScanScout, Inc., File No. 102-3185, No. C-4344
(F.T.C. Dec. 14, 2011).
313. Id. at 3.
314. Id. at 4.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 2.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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3. Failure to Secure Personal Information
A website’s failure to secure users’ personal data may be better
characterized as a “broken promise” than as a failure to notify.320
With regard to data security harms, the FTC does not focus on
whether or not websites provided users with sufficient notice, but
whether they breached their vows to keep user data secure.321 For
example, the FTC complaint in In re Eli Lily & Co., is silent on the
issue of notice.322 Instead, the FTC was concerned with how the
pharmaceutical company, Eli Lily & Co. (“Eli Lily”), breached its
promise to keep consumers’ personal information confidential,323 and
the company’s failure to provide training, checks, and controls over
consumers’ sensitive information.324
Similarly, in United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., the FTC did not
characterize ChoicePoint Inc.’s (“ChoicePoint”) failure to secure
consumers’ personal data in terms of notice.325 ChoicePoint was a
company that furnished personal data, like Social Security numbers,
dates of birth, and credit card histories, to governments and
businesses.326 In its complaint, the FTC found that ChoicePoint
violated Section 5 because it failed to employ “reasonable and
appropriate security measures” to protect consumers’ personal
information.327 Though the FTC found that ChoicePoint violated
Section 5, concerns for proper notice were not part of the FTC’s
inquiry.328 Rather, the FTC’s concerns focused on ChoicePoint’s

320. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 643; Reidenberg et al., supra note 47,
at 27 (“While the notice and choice framework may be effective to protect against
privacy harms in some areas, the framework will inherently be unable to protect
against some of the articulated harms. Breaches of commitments made in notices will
violate the terms of user consent and create unauthorized disclosures, the inadequacy
of data security cannot be cured by notice, and mismatches for data retention
preclude the capability for notice to avoid the privacy harms.”).
321. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 28.
322. See generally Complaint, In re Eli Lily & Co., FTC File No. 012 3214, No. C4047 (F.T.C. May 8, 2002).
323. Id. at 2. Despite its promise, Eli Lily disclosed the email addresses of 669 of
its customers after sending a mass email and leaving customers’ emails visible in the
“to:” line of the message. Id.
324. Id. at 3.
325. See generally Complaint, United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., FTC File No.
0523069 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
326. Id. at 3.
327. Id. at 9.
328. See id.
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failures to sustain reasonable security measures, as well as the
company’s breached privacy promises to consumers.329

4. Unlawful Retention of Personal Information
FTC enforcement actions also cover instances in which companies
unnecessarily retain personal data.330 Still, the FTC does not address
unlawful retention as a problem of insufficient notice, but as a
security risk.331 For example, in its complaint against CardSystems
Solutions, Inc. (“CardSystems”), the FTC held that CardSystems
failed to reasonably secure personal information that was stored on
its computer network.332 The FTC found that, in addition to failing to
take reasonable measures to secure consumer data from hackers,
CardSystems generated unnecessary risks by storing information for
up to 30 days in an insecure state.333 Like other FTC complaints, the
company’s retention practices were not challenged because
consumers were not notified of how long their data was retained,
rather, the retention practice was considered a Section 5 violation in
that it caused the security and confidentiality of consumer data to be
compromised.334
D. Notice Problems in the Online World
This Part examines various barriers to sufficient notice in the
online space. This Part also analyzes different obstacles that
consumers encounter when they are confronted with websites’
privacy agreements, and how they prevent consumers from gaining
awareness of websites’ data handling practices. Specifically, this Part
explores notice problems such as the high cost of reading privacy
policies, the vague and misleading language that privacy polices

329. Id. at 9, 11; see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 628; Reidenberg et
al., supra note 47, at 28.
330. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., File No. 0423160,
No. C-4148 (F.T.C. June 16, 2005) (finding the store “created unnecessary risks
to . . . information by storing it for up to 30 days when it no longer had a business
need to keep the information”); Complaint, In re Ceridian Corp., FTC File No. 102
3160, No. C-4325 (F.T.C. June 8, 2011) (finding the business “created unnecessary
risks to personal information by storing it indefinitely on its network without a
business need”).
331. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 17, at 651, 653.
332. See Complaint at 2, In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., FTC File No. 052 3148,
No. C-4168 (F.T.C. Sept. 5, 2006).
333. Id.
334. See id.
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commonly use, and consumers’ general lack of awareness of how
companies appropriate their personal data.

1. The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies
In the domains of arbitration provisions, FDA drug labeling and
FTC enforcement actions, effective notice is critical to consumers’
informed consent and awareness of risk. While settled principles of
sufficient notice govern these areas of law, there is presently much
discourse on how notice should be dispensed in the online world.335
Under the notice and choice model, it is expected that online
consumers self-manage their privacy by reading websites’ privacy
policies, and, upon notice of these terms, choose whether or not to
consent to them.336 However, some scholars contend that privacy
policies fail to provide consumers with meaningful notice of websites’
data practices.337 Research shows that a majority of consumers fail to
pay substantial attention to online notice statements.338 For example,
in a study only 4.5% reported that they “always read” privacy policies
and only 14.1% reported to “frequently” read them.339 Subjects of
this study reported that privacy statements were too long and verbose
to read.340
335. See e.g., Usable Privacy Project, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (2016),
http://www.usableprivacy.org/ [https://perma.cc/63FM-LZUS] (exploring how natural
language processing technology can be used to enhance notice of privacy policy
conditions and terms).
336. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883 (2013).
337. FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz has stated: “Initially, privacy policies seemed
like a good idea. But in practice, they often leave a lot to be desired. In many cases,
consumers don’t notice, read, or understand the privacy policies.” Id. at 1884-85,
(citing Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r Fed. Trade Comm’n, So Private, So Public:

Individuals, the Internet & the Paradox of Behavioral Marketing, Remarks at the
FTC Town Hall Meeting on Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, &
Technology (Nov. 1, 2007)).
338. A 2002 study showed that only about .3% of Yahoo users read the websites
privacy policy. Even after Yahoo began to send users’ advertisements to their email
accounts and mail, this figure rose to only 1%. See id. Another study reported that
despite the fact that 63 out of 63 respondents reported to valuing privacy, only three
reported to always reading online privacy. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 13.
339. Solove, supra note 336, at 1884 n.14 (citing George R. Milne & Mary J.
Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why Consumers Read (or
Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15, 20-21
(2004)).
340. See Milne & Culnan, supra note 339, at 23 (finding one respondent of this
study complained that “[p]rivacy notices are deliberately made too long and verbose.
How about the ‘Privacy Notice for Dummies’ version?”). Other research has shown
that consumers generally face considerable difficulty when trying to decipher policy
privacy terms. See Aleecia M. McDonald, et al., A Comparative Study of Online
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Consumers may refrain from reading privacy policies because they
are too time-consuming and costly to read.341 Aleecia M. McDonald
and Lorrie Faith Cranor investigated this proposition and studied the
true costs of reading privacy policies.342 They calculated how much
time and money the U.S. population would expend by reading every
single privacy policy that it was exposed to over the course of a
year.343 The study took into account variables like opportunity costs
of reading privacy policies,344 the total amount of time it would take to
read the privacy policies, and the financial value of that time.345
McDonald and Cranor calculated that Americans, on average, visit
1462 unique websites annually.346 The participants of their study
spent a median of 23 to 24 minutes reading a typical 2500-word
policy.347 McDonald and Cranor determined that if Americans were
to read every single privacy policy in a year, it would take them
approximately 201 hours and cost them about $3534 annually.348 They
further calculated that if all Americans were to read privacy policies

Privacy Policies and Formats, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 37 (Ian
Goldberg & Mikhail J. Atallah eds., 2009) (finding that “[m]ost privacy policies
require a college reading level and an ability to decode legalistic, confusing, or
jargon-laden phrases”).
341. See Solove, supra note 336, at 1885.
342. See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 540 (2008).
343. Id. at 548.
344. This included the loss of a potential financial gain when time is spent reading a
privacy policy rather than an alternative, and potentially profitable, activity. Id. at
558-59.
345. Id. at 559-62.
346. Id. at 558. Some scholars assert that the multitude of privacy policies that
consumers are exposed to on an annual basis alone may deter consumers from
reading them. Daniel Solve has described this as the “overload effect,” stating that
the problem is similar to that of a student whose professors aggregately assign an
excess of reading each night. In Solve’s analogy, each professor believes their
assigned reading is reasonable, but every professor assigns their own reading each
night, the collective amount is too high. Thus, Solve concludes “even if all companies
provided notice and adequate choices, this data management problem would persist;
the average person just does not have enough time or resources to manage all the
entities that hold her data.” See Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at 4 (citing Solve,
supra note 336, at 1889).
347. See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 552-53. See also PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 70 (“A particularly strong illustration of
where privacy notices have been ineffective is in the mobile context where, because
of the small size of the device, a privacy notice can be spread out over 100 separate
screens. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine consumers scrolling through each screen or
making informed decisions based on the information contained in them.”).
348. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 562.
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word for word, the value of time lost would total about $781 billion
annually.349
McDonald and Cranor concluded that typical consumers’ failure to
read privacy policies may not evince a lack of concern for privacy.350
Rather, the great expense of reading privacy policies may simply
outweigh Internet users’ perceived costs of privacy harms.351
McDonald and Cranor proposed that websites should reduce the cost
of reading privacy policies.352 They concluded that decreasing the
amount of time it takes to read a privacy policy, which could entail
reducing the amount of text displayed, would enhance privacy
policies’ practical benefits and utility to consumers.353

2. Ambiguity and Consumer Misunderstanding
a. Ambiguity of Privacy Policy Language
Research suggests that privacy policies are verbose, legalistic, and
generally hard to read,354 and that the language of privacy policies is
ambiguous and misleading.355 Thus, even if readers were able to
understand the complex language of a privacy policy, there may still
be confusion over what the terms of the policy actually mean.356 A
study by Professor Irene Pollach further demonstrates that the

349. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 562.
350. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 565. See also Chris Hoofnagle et al.,

How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to Information
Privacy
Attitudes
&
Policies?,
20
(April
14,
2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864 (surveying respondents
of younger and older age and finding that large proportions of each group cared
about their data privacy). See also PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38,
at 28-30, (citing studies that show that consumers care about their privacy and that a
majority of consumers are uncomfortable with being tracked online).
351. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 565.
352. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 565.
353. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 342, at 565. See also Patrick Gage Kelly, A
“Nutrition Label” for Privacy, in SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY
(2009), https://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/proceedings/a4-kelley.pdf (studying how
privacy policies displayed in nutrition label-style formats can improve how consumers
read and accurately interpret privacy policy terms).
354. See Milne & Culnan, supra note 339, at 23..
355. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83.
356. See Patrick Cage Kelly, Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of
CHI
2010:
PRIVACY
(2010),
the
Nutrition
Label
Approach,
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/23d6/ba79ae62fb928947c3330217d8b3ca23ff6f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SGE9-X5ZR] (“Rarely is a policy written such that consumers have
a clear understanding of where and when their data is collected, how and by whom it
will be used, if it will be shared outside of the entity that collected it, and for how long
and in what form it will be stored.”).
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language of privacy policies may create more confusion than clarity.357
Pollach analyzed the rhetorical patterns of fifty different privacy
policies, finding that common trends in vocabulary, syntax, and
grammar created ambiguity and confusion.358 She determined that
the choice of vocabulary in selected privacy policies “sugar-coat[ed]”
companies’ data handling practices by de-emphasizing their
invasiveness and framing the practices in a positive light.359
Pollach also observed that privacy policies frequently denied that
certain data practices were carried out.360 She found that negative
statements such as “except as otherwise stated we do not . . . ”
effectively gave companies “carte blanch . . . to engage in any practice
not expressly ruled out.”361 Finally, Pollach observed that use of
“modal” verbs and adverbs, such as “may,” “might,” and “perhaps”
was a common trend among selected policies.362 For example, a
model phrase might state “[f]rom time to time [we] may also provide
names, addresses or email addresses to strategic partners who have
information, products or services that may be of interest to you.”363
She asserted that such modal language downplayed the frequency
with which companies actually participated in data collection
practices and allowed for open-ended interpretations of how
companies appropriated consumer data.364 Pollach concluded that
companies likely draft privacy policies more with the aim to avoid
privacy litigation than to inform consumers of their data handling
practices.365 She asserted that vague privacy policy language should

357. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 104.
358. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 105-06 (finding that when asking questions
pertaining to key privacy concerns such as data collection, data storage, and
unsolicited marketing communications of fifty different privacy policies, 39.4% of
questions could not be answered because the policies lacked sufficient information).
359. Pollach, supra note 13, at 106.
360. Pollach, supra note 13, at 106 (finding that “not” was the ninth most popular
word used throughout all privacy policies studied).
361. Pollach, supra note 13, at 106.
362. Pollach, supra note 13, at 106.
363. Pollach, supra note 13, at 107.
364. Pollach, supra note 13, at 106 (finding 948 instances of “may” and 123
instances of “might, perhaps, sometimes, occasional(ly), and from time to time” in
the study).
365. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 107. See also PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 19 (“Too often, privacy policies appear designed more to
limit companies’ liability than to inform consumers about how their information will
be used.”).
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be clarified to minimize ambiguity and accurately convey companies’
true privacy terms.366

b. Misunderstanding of Privacy Policy Text
Other scholars’ research suggests that, due to the vagueness of
privacy policy language, even legal experts may have difficulty
understanding their terms.367 A study exploring privacy policy
ambiguity surveyed three groups of participants: “Privacy Policy
Experts,” which was composed of legal and public policy scholars;
“Knowledgeable Users,” which consisted of law and computer science
students; and “Crowd workers,” which were selected as a
representative sample of the general population.368 All participants
were required to read a privacy policy and then answer a question
about a privacy practice (i.e., “Does the policy state that the website
might collect contact information about its users?”).369 After selecting
from the options “Yes,” “No,” “Unclear,” or “Not Applicable,”
participants were asked to highlight the portion of policy text that
supported their answer choice.370
Basing their judgments on privacy policies alone, study participants
frequently disagreed upon the nature of companies’ data-handling
practices.371 This disagreement was even apparent among the Privacy
Policy Experts group, which consisted of four of the study authors
who were experienced law and public policy scholars.372 The study
found that Privacy Policy Experts only reached a consensus on
whether websites shared consumers’ financial information 62.5% of
the time, and only reached a consensus on whether websites’ shared
health information 50% of the time.373 Vague policy terminology like
“personal information” invited too much room for interpretation and
made it difficult for privacy experts to agree on the kind of

366. Pollach, supra note 13, at 107-08. See also Reidenberg et al., supra note 47, at
26. (“Vague notices do not provide users with meaningful information about
practices to which they are asked to consent. Such vague and incomplete notices deny
users the ability to control their personal information . . . . By contrast, notice that is
complete, accurate, and specific regarding the terms that explain how, with whom,
and for what purpose a user’s information will be shared enable effective consent
from the user.”).
367. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 40.
368. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 53-54.
369. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 56-57.
370. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 57-59.
371. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83.
372. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 54.
373. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 65.
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information that websites collected.374 The study determined that
privacy policies were often worded too ambiguously to convey
effective notice, as privacy experts could not agree upon the accurate
meaning of all of the privacy policy statements.375 Due to poor
drafting and confusing language, even experienced privacy scholars
could not produce a uniform, professional interpretation of the
privacy policies’ terms.376
Disagreement was even more pronounced between the
Knowledgeable Users and crowd worker groups. Knowledgeable
User participants only agreed with each other 60% of the time when
asked if a website’s privacy policy indicated collection of shared
location information data.377 Similarly, crowd workers only agreed
with each other 40% of the time when asked this same question.378
The study concluded that overall lack of agreement among the three
surveyed groups indicated that privacy policies lacked clarity and
described data collection practices poorly.379 The study determined
that websites must candidly “spell out” their privacy practices to
improve consumers’ understandings of terms.380 It asserted that lack
of agreement and difficulties in interpretation evinced that consumers
were being misled by website privacy policies.381 The study contended
that if privacy policies could not convey notice in a manner that a
“reasonable person” could understand, then notice and choice failed
as a framework.382

c. False Assumptions and Lack of Awareness
Research suggests that typical online consumers are unaware of the
nature and scope of companies’ data collection practices.383

374. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 79.
375. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 79.
376. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 79.
377. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 65.
378. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 65.
379. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83-85.
380. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83-84 (“To have contextual integrity,
the granular aspects of a data practice, not just whether a website collects, shares or
deletes personal information in general, will need to be understandable to a user.
Indeed, a policy statement acknowledging general data collection and/or sharing may
do very little to inform readers about the practices relevant to the user.”).
381. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83.
382. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83.
383. See Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three
Activities that Enable It, 21 (2009) (finding 54% of survey respondents wrongly
stated that it was “True” that websites with privacy policies had to delete information
like name and address upon their request); Solove, supra note 336, at 1886.
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Consumers commonly harbor false assumptions about how websites
collect their personal data.384 Scholars Solon Barocas and Helen
Nissenbaum contend that there are some key data collection and
sharing norms that are simply unapparent to online consumers.385
They note that when consumers access a website, they may not be
aware that contracting third party advertisers may be tracking their
interactions with that site.386 Even if a website reveals how it collects
consumer data through its privacy policy, this disclosure may still be
incomplete because consumers are uninformed of how potential third
party affiliates use their information.387 Privacy policies cannot
describe the tracking and data handling practices of third party
advertisers, as websites are practically limited to disclosures about
their own privacy practices.388 Thus, the disclosures of privacy policies
are inherently incomplete because policies fail to describe the full
extent of what happens to consumer data.389 Unbeknownst to
consumers, third party advertisers may use personal data in a manner
that contravenes the privacy promises of the main website.390
The “fickle” nature of privacy policies might also undermine
consumers’ expectations of privacy.391 Many consumers may be
unaware that the terms of privacy policies are often updated and
changed.392 As a result, consumers do not possess one absolute set of
privacy rights under any given privacy policy. Describing the
“fickleness” of privacy policies, Solon and Nissenbaum reference the
New York Times website, which at one point, reserved the right to
change the terms of the privacy policy upon thirty days’ notice.393 As
a result, consumers that wished to stay informed of any potential
changes bore the onus of checking the website’s privacy statement
every month.394 Solon and Nissenbaum concluded that the “short

384. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 11 at 78-80.
385. See generally Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56 at 5.
386. See generally Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56 at 5.
387. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56 at 5.
388. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56 at 6.
389. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56 at 6.
390. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56 at 6; see also GOMEZ ET AL., supra
note 59, at 4. (“While most policies stated that information would not be shared with
third parties, many of these sites allowed third party tracking through web bugs . . . .
It makes little sense to disclaim formal information sharing, but allow functionally
equivalent tracking with third parties . . . . Users do not know and cannot learn the
full range of affiliates with which websites may share information.”).
391. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5.
392. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5-6.
393. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5.
394. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5.
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shelf-life” of online privacy policies undercut consumers’ abilities to
form accurate expectations of websites’ privacy terms.395 When
subjected to changing terms, consumers may find that their former
privacy expectations are no longer valid.396
III. ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE ONLINE NOTICE
As explored in Part C, the current format and content of typical
online privacy policies routinely fail to notify consumers of
companies’ data collecting and sharing practices. Privacy policies are
poorly drafted with vague and misleading language. Beyond this,
privacy policies are too costly to read, and companies can freely
modify core privacy terms without affirmatively notifying consumers.
The chronic ineffectiveness of online privacy policies is highly
problematic, as sufficient notice is central to an individual’s ability to
offer informed consent when sharing information online. Examining
elements of effective legal notice from different legal models is an
important preliminary step in resolving pervasive notice problems
online. In the domain of arbitration clauses, for example, a showing
of effective notice may evince individuals’ knowing and voluntary
waiver of guaranteed legal rights. In the context of FDA drug
labeling rules, effective notice may ensure that consumers are
properly apprised of warnings and directions for safe use. Finally,
effective notice is inherent to FTC enforcement actions against
unauthorized disclosures and surreptitious data collection.
Part III extracts the most salient elements of effective online
notice from the aforementioned legal models. Using core common
law principles of notice, and with reference to well-settled concepts of
constructive notice and mutual assent, this Part evaluates the
sufficiency of notice and “contract formation in cyberspace.”397 Part
III also extracts principles from established legal paradigms to
determine what constitutes effective online notice. By borrowing
standards from judicial and administrative law, this Part outlines the
most crucial elements of effective online notice. This Part also
suggests how commercial websites can incorporate these elements
into their regular data collection practices, which if implemented, may
mitigate or prevent the notice problems discussed in Part C. These
elements are also summarized in tables, which are featured in the
Appendix to this Note.

395. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 6.
396. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5-6.
397. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002).
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A. The Format of Effective Notice

1. Readable Text
Effective notice demands that the text of privacy policies be legible
and relatively easy to comprehend. Consumers commonly encounter
difficulty with densely worded paragraphs of privacy policy text.398
Though consumers tend to care about their online privacy, the
majority of consumers do not read websites’ privacy policies, with
some complaining that the language of privacy policies is too legalistic
and verbose.399 The difficulty of reading privacy policies is thus a
barrier to effective notice, as it discourages consumers from apprising
themselves of privacy terms.400 To achieve effective notice, the format
of privacy policies should enhance their eye appeal and legibility.
Incorporating the FDA’s rule for “chunked” text may help to attain
this goal.401
On average, a privacy policy consists of 2500 words.402 As the FDA
determined, dense paragraphs of fine print lack eye appeal and tend
to overload consumers with information.403 The same issues likely
pertain to privacy policies, which often explain terms in paragraph
form or in the context of one long statement. Chunking privacy
policy information into lists would make privacy policies more usable
for consumers. Adopting this formatting style would reduce the
“cognitive load” many consumers may experience when reading
dense blocks of privacy policy text.404 Readers would not have to
parse through an entire policy to find dispersed pieces of text that
pertain to a specific data collection practice. For example, listing all
terms that describe data sharing under a centralized heading would
enable consumers to easily locate information related to this topic.405
To accelerate readers’ comprehension, companies could also organize
core privacy terms under bullets,406 which would visually stand out on

398. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 70 (“[P]rivacy notices
are often opaque, lack uniformity, and are too long and difficult to navigate. Too
frequently they bury disclosures of important information.”).
399. See Milne & Culnan, supra note 339, at 23.
400. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 70.
401. See Vigilante & Wogalter, supra note 239, at 105.
402. See McDonald & Cranor, surpa note 342, at 552.
403. See Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg.
13254, 13255 (Mar. 17, 1999).
404. See id.
405. See Vigilante & Wogalter, supra note 239, at 104.
406. See Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at
13265-66.
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a page and would naturally lead consumers’ eyes to listed
statements.407 This formatting device may therefore be of particular
use when alerting consumers to practices like sharing of financial
data, which may expose consumers to special risks. Dividing privacy
policy statements into discrete segments and lists could also reduce
the frequency of consumer reading errors.408
If all privacy policies displayed key privacy terms in a standardized
order, consumers could become familiar with this format and learn
where to find specific terms in any privacy statement.409 FDA labeling
practices suggest that standardizing the sequence of privacy policy
statements could reduce consumer confusion over policy terms.410
Information across different OTC drug labels is displayed under the
same headings and in a uniform order, and labels are organized
according to core drug facts such as directions, warnings, and
ingredients.411 Similarly, a uniform privacy policy sequence could be
organized with respect to key privacy terms. Such key terms would
reference data collection practices that present the greatest risk to
consumers for privacy harms. These terms would relate to practices
such as data collection, sharing, and retention.
Presenting privacy terms in a uniform order would also reduce the
burden of reading privacy policies.412 This format would enable
consumers to quickly identify a website’s key privacy conditions.413
Standardization would have the additional benefit of enabling
consumers to compare privacy terms across different privacy
statements.414 If all privacy policies presented information in the same
format and order, consumers could read two policies side by side and
discern how data collection practices differ. This ability to compare

407. See ScanScout Decision and Order, supra note 312, at 2.
408. See Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at
13266; Vigilante & Wogalter, supra note 239, at 104 (“Results indicated that list
format instructions that included screen pictographs yielded fewer errors and help
requests and decreased task completion times. The authors suggested that the list
format allowed participants, particularly those familiar with the computer system, to
scan the instructions for keywords. Other research has indicated that information
grouping can facilitate the search and acquisition of information.”).
409. See Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at
13258.
410. See id. at 13264, 13266, 13271.
411. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 (2014).
412. See Kelley et al., supra note 353, at 11.
413. See Kelley et al., supra note 353, at 11.
414. See Kelley et al., supra note 353, at 11; Over-the-Counter Human Drugs;
Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. at 13258.
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different privacy policies would encourage consumers to actively
manage their privacy.415
Further, distilling paragraphs of privacy policy text into short and
direct phrases could also enhance the effectiveness of privacy notices.
As the FDA determined, statements that contain shorter sentences
with simple terminology tend to reduce consumers’ cognitive
processing demands.416 Reducing the text of privacy policies could
free up consumers’ memory and enable them to understand policies
at a faster rate.417
Some privacy statements may be too detailed to reduce to shorter
statements. Therefore, it may be helpful to feature a full privacy
policy on a website that is juxtaposed with a summarized privacy
statements as a companion. This would operate similarly to how
OTC medications feature uniform product labels, but sometimes have
package inserts that contain more extensive drug facts.418 Just as
consumers read OTC drugs labels to learn of potential health risks
prior to their purchase, online users could refer to shortened
statements of core privacy terms, such as data collection, sharing, and
retention, prior to interacting with a website or transmitting personal
data. Since consumers are not likely to read long privacy policies, a
brief, summarized companion statement could, at the very least, offer
a general landscape of a website’s terms.
Symbolic representations of privacy warnings could also enhance
the effectiveness of online notice. As previously discussed, the FDA
endorses the use of pictograms to depict proper product use and
minimize safety risks for non-English speaking consumers of OTC
drugs and other products.419 Websites could also graphically convey
privacy warnings through visual illustrations. For example, a symbol
signifying the collection of location information may depict a globe or
map and could offer consumers enhanced notice of this practice.
Interpreting such a symbol would not require command of any
415. See Kelley et al., supra note 353, at 11; see also PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 69 (noting that improving consumers’ abilities to compare
data practices across companies would encourage competition on privacy issues and
in providing consumers with access to their data).
416. See Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg.
13254, 13255 (Mar. 17, 1999).
417. Id.
418. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE: DRUG SAFETY
INFORMATION-FDA’S COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC 7 (Mar. 2007),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guid
ances/ucm072281.pdf [https://perma.cc/83UT-6PS9].
419. See Infant Formula; Labeling Requirements, 48 Fed. Reg. 31880-01, 31883
(July 12, 1983).

1158

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

particular language, so consumers of all backgrounds could
comprehend its message.420 The universal meaning of privacy symbols
could provide consumers with identifiable warnings regardless of
their primary language.
Furthermore, symbols would apprise
consumers with more instantly recognizable warnings, as opposed to
typical blocks of privacy policy text, which must be read and
interpreted.

2. Conspicuous Disclosures
Online privacy statements should conspicuously stand out to
consumers on a webpage.421 This visibility is necessary for consumers
to notice and manifest consent to companies’ privacy terms.422 In the
contract domain, constructive notice is premised on the idea that a
party would have discovered a disputed provision had they been
diligent.423 Yet even diligent readers of privacy policies might be
unlikely to notice important terms, as disclosures of key data practices
are often buried in text or articulated in ambiguous language.
Presenting privacy terms in small print and dispersing them
throughout dense paragraphs is akin to the contract notion of unfair
surprise.424 Scattering critical disclosures throughout copious text
effectively conceals these statements in plain sight.
If online consumers cannot learn of a website’s privacy practices
after reading its privacy statement, then they cannot be placed on
constructive notice of a website’s data collection practices.425 Rather,
it can only be said that online consumers have constructive notice of
these practices if they would have had a fair opportunity to learn of

420. See id.
421. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous
manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic
bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.”).
422. Id. at 31.
423. Steel Warehouse Co. Inc. v. Abalone Shipping Ltd., 141 F.3d 234, 237 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“Constructive notice can be defined, crudely, as a rule in which ‘if you
should have known something, you’ll be held responsible for what you should have
known.’”).
424. See Zaborowski v, MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (“Surprise involves the extent to which supposedly agreed-upon terms of
the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to
enforce them.”); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Ct.
App, 1982) (same).
425. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CONDUCT AS MANIFESTATION
OF ASSENT § 19(2) (1981).
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them after reading a website’s privacy statement.426 Applying this
contract standard, privacy policies should, at the very least, put
consumers on constructive notice of a website’s data practices. In
other words, privacy policies should be formatted so that “reasonably
prudent” consumers will be capable of understanding their terms
after reviewing them.427
Critical privacy terms (like those pertaining to the collection or
sharing of personally identifiable data) should be conspicuously
pronounced in the body of policy text so that they are easily
noticed.428 “User-friendly” formatting devices such as bold type,
italics, capital letters, headings, and subheadings can also be used to
highlight these terms and guide consumers’ eyes to important
disclosures.429 These formatting devices may be implemented for
visual contrast and to ensure that vital conditions are not buried in
fine print.
Consumers cannot learn of privacy policy terms that they
physically cannot see. Therefore, imposing minimum type size
requirements, as the FDA implemented in its labeling rule, could also
improve online notice.430 A mandatory baseline type size could
ensure that statements are clearer to see and more easily stand out on
a webpage. Moreover, this minimum standard would ensure that a
wider audience of consumers could read privacy policies, especially
those with imperfect vision.431
FTC privacy jurisprudence suggests how websites can enhance
actual and constructive notice of the choice to opt-out of their data
collection practices. As the FTC demonstrated in ScanScout,
effective notice requires websites to conspicuously disclose how
consumers can opt-out of data collection practices.432 In ScanScout,
the FTC described how opt-out mechanisms should be “clearly and

426. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: WHEN A MISREPRESENTATION
PREVENTS FORMATION OF A CONTRACT § 163 (1981).
427. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002).
428. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at vii (“[A]lthough
privacy policies may not be a good tool for communicating with most consumers, they
still could play an important role in promoting transparency, accountability, and
competition among companies on privacy issues – but only if the policies are clear,
concise, and easy-to-read.”).
429. See Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg.
13254, 13254 (Mar. 17, 1999).
430. See generally id.
431. See generally, Watanabe, supra note 249 (studying the geriatric population’s
ability to comprehend fine print amid visual impairment).
432. See In re ScanScout, Inc., File No. 102-3185, No. C-4344, 2-3 (F.T.C. Dec. 14,
2011).
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prominently” displayed to consumers.433 The FTC prescribed that the
“type, size, and location” of this mechanism be “sufficiently
noticeable” for consumers to read.434 The FTC also required that the
disclosure statement contrast highly with a webpage’s background.435
Visible opt-out mechanisms are also critical to consumers’
awareness and abstention from the clandestine tracking and
collection practices of online advertisers.436
The majority of
consumers are not aware that third party advertisers track their data
to display ads and likely would not search for an opt-out mechanism
on a website. Thus, opt-out mechanisms should be visible enough to
alert consumers of, and assist them in, revoking their participation in
discreet marketing practices.437 Ideally, opt-out mechanisms should
be prominently displayed on a webpage to ensure that when
companies do share personal information for marketing purposes,
consumers are offering informed consent.
B. The Content of Effective Notice

1. Accurate Disclosures
As an initial matter, websites should accurately disclose how and
when they collect sensitive, personally identifiable consumer data as
well as the types of personally identifiable data that they collect.
Consumers cannot offer informed consent to privacy terms if they do
not know what practices they are assenting to, and sharing sensitive
or personally identifiable data places consumers at a greater risk of

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 6.
See Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman & Kimberly Meltzer, Open to
Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline, UNIV. OF PA., ANNENBERG
PUB.
POL’Y
CTR.
5
(2005),
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc_papers
(“[T]he government should require retailers to disclose specifically what data they
have collected about individual customers as well as when and how they use those
data to influence interactions with them.”); PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra
note 38, at 60 (“Different mechanisms for obtaining opt-in and opt-out consent can
vary in their effectiveness. Indeed, a clear, simple, and prominent opt-out mechanism
may be more privacy protective than a confusing, opaque opt-in. Staff has already
stated that, regardless of how they are described, choices buried within long privacy
policies and pre-checked boxes are not effective means of obtaining meaningful,
informed consent. Further, the time and effort required for consumers to understand
and exercise their options may be more relevant to the issue of informed consent
than whether the choice is technically opt-in or opt out.”).

2015]

YOU DIDN'T EVEN NOTICE!

1161

privacy harms.438 Without accurately describing the true nature and
scope of their data collection practices, websites impose risks onto
consumers, which they were never given a choice to assume.
Furthermore, websites’ actual data collection practices of
personally identifiable data should not contradict the disclosures of
their privacy statements. For example, in GeoCities, the FTC found
that GeoCities breached its own privacy policy by collecting users’
names, birthdates, zip codes, and “optional” information, such as
education level, income, and occupation.439 The Geocities privacy
policy stated that it would “NEVER” share this data with anyone
without user permission.440 In practice, however, Geocities rented
and sold users’ personally identifiable information to third party
advertisers without users’ informed consent.441
Accurate disclosures in privacy policies are even more critical in
instances where consumers do not expect to be subject to data
collection or sharing. Consumers often do not suspect that websites
gather their personal data.442 Websites should thus present clear and
specific disclosures that describe the actual mechanisms they employ
if they collect or share consumer data. In other words, if certain
features of a website, like that of a downloadable toolbar, gather data
in a manner that consumers would not ordinarily expect, that website
should disclose this data collection practice so consumers do not
develop erroneous assumptions about the purposes of those features.
This would help ensure that companies’ commercial websites do not
actively or inadvertently mislead consumers’ expectations of privacy.

2. Precise Language
Privacy policies should provide consumers with accurate and
concrete descriptions of websites’ data collection practices. Presently,
many privacy statements are too ambiguous to provide consumers
with clear impressions of websites’ data collection practices.443 For
example, rather than stating that a website collects users “personal
438. See Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining sharing consumers’
credit card numbers or banking information, for example, exposes consumers to a
greater threat of identity theft).
439. See GeoCities Complaint, supra note 278, at 2-4.
440. Id. at 3.
441. Id.
442. See Turow, Feldman & Meltzer, supra note 437, at 3 (finding that 75% of
those surveyed did not “know the correct response—false—to the statement, ‘When
a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my information with
other websites and companies.’”); Solove, supra note 336, at 1886.
443. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 64.
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information”—an indefinite term—a privacy statement should list the
actual kinds of information that a website collects. Additionally,
articulating privacy policy statements in direct, action-oriented
phrases could improve consumer notice. Similar to how the FDA
requires OTC drug labels to feature statements such as, “see your
doctor if . . . ,” privacy statements could be formulated to give
consumers clear ideas of what steps they should take to secure their
data.444 For example, if a privacy policy states that a website uses
cookies to collect user data, it could follow this disclosure with a
directive phrase such as, “to change your privacy settings . . . ” to help
consumers limit such collection. These instructive statements would
offer clarity as to what specific steps consumers could take to
proactively manage their privacy.
Changing the grammar and syntax of some online disclosure
statements could also make notice more effective. Permissive phrases
such as “may collect,” “may share,” and “from time to time”
contribute to consumer confusion.445
Instead, effective notice
statements should be expressed in definite language to inform
consumers if a website does indeed engage in a particular practice.
Replacing terms like “may collect” or “from time to time” with “we
will collect your data when . . . ,” and “we will share your data
with . . . ” would clarify the nature and extent of websites’ actual data
collection methods.
More so, articulating disclosures in
straightforward terms would deter consumers from developing false
expectations of websites’ privacy conditions.446 This is because
conditional terminology can conjure doubt as to the extent of a
website’s participation in data collection.447
Finally, changing the structure of some privacy statements from the
passive voice to the active voice could increase the clarity of privacy
disclosures.448 Modifying vague, typical policy phrases such as, “your
information may be shared” to “we share your information with X, Y,
444. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.66(c)(5)(vii) (2014) (“Stop use an ask a doctor if . . . ”).
445. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106-07.
446. See Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 3. In its complaint, the FTC states
that the Upromise TurboSaver Privacy Statement declared that the Toolbar may
“infrequently” collect some personal information and “every commercially viable
effort” would be made “to purge their databases of any personally identifiable
information.” Upromise Complaint, supra note 10, at 3. Nevertheless, the FTC
found that the Toolbar transmitted the personally identifiable information that it
gathered. This information included credit card and financial account numbers and
Social Security numbers entered into secure web pages. Upromise Complaint, supra
note 10, at 3.
447. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106-07.
448. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106.
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Z . . . ” would give consumers better insight into what actors are
handling their data.449 Passive sentence structures enable websites to
downplay their participation in data collection, and conceal what
other parties may be involved in such practices.450 Adopting the
active voice in disclosure statements would make which parties are
accountable for data collection and sharing more apparent.

3. Affirmative Consent to Modified Material Terms
Some courts have held that revised contracts merely have the status
of a new offer, and are not binding on a party until its terms are
accepted.451 A party must therefore be notified of new terms to
manifest assent; “an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless
he knows of its existence.”452 Applying this contract principle to
online privacy agreements, websites too should require consumers to
affirmatively agree to privacy policy changes prior to appropriating
consumer data in a materially different manner.453 At minimum,
effective notice requires websites to apprise consumers of material
changes to privacy policy terms and to obtain consumers’ consent.
The contract principle of unconscionability may also be applicable
in cases in which websites unilaterally change their terms without
notice. In Hooters v. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce
an arbitration provision in an employee contract because the
employer reserved the right to change arbitration terms at any point
post-agreement.454 In this same way, privacy policies could be
considered voidable if companies make material modifications
without attaining consumer notice and consent. Companies’ abilities
to alter consumers’ privacy rights at will and without notice reflect a
disparity in bargaining power between companies and consumers.
This lack of mutuality has been held to be a defining characteristic of
an unconscionable and voidable agreement.455

449. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106.
450. See Pollach, supra note 13, at 106.
451. See Douglas v. U.S. District Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066
(N.D. Cal. 2007)
452. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:16 (
Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 1990).
453. See Douglas v. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.
2007) (“A revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the parties until it is
accepted.”) (citing Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperating Ass’n v. Monaghan, 188
F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1951)).
454. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 1173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999).
455. See id. at 936.
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FTC jurisprudence also suggests that websites’ material
modifications to privacy policies without consumers’ consent may
qualify as an “unfair . . . practice.”456 In Facebook, for example, the
FTC determined that Facebook committed a deceptive practice
because it changed its privacy policy to increase the visibility of users’
accounts to third parties.457 As Facebook demonstrates, routine
notice of material policy changes is critical in the context of social
media websites, as these websites especially gather vast quantities of
personally identifiable information.
Social media websites in
particular should routinely request consumers’ express consent prior
to executing changes that could alter the privacy of personal data;
such websites should not commence new data collection or sharing
practices prior to receiving this express consent.458
On the whole, requiring routine agreement to policy changes could
ultimately create more realistic expectations of online privacy.459
Acquiring consumers’ express consent to modifications would endow
them with a more meaningful say in how their data is appropriated.
Finally, alerting consumers to material changes would relieve them of
the onus of having to regularly check for modifications in privacy
terms. Consumers would be able to rely on the fact that the websites
would apprise them of updates as soon as “fickle” privacy policies
were modified.460

4. “Knowing and Voluntary” Assent
Some data collection practices prompt consumers to waive privacy
rights that are protected by state and federal statutes. For example,
some websites have been known to collect personally identifiable
health and financial data from consumers.461 These collection
practices contravene the statutory purposes of HIPAA, which guards
the privacy of medical records,462 and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,

456. See Facebook, Complaint, supra note 288, at 9.
457. See id.
458. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 76-77.
459. See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 76-77.
460. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5-6.
461. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 63 (evaluating study participants’
awareness of companies collection practices of health and financial data.).
462. HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.).
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which prevents financial institutions from disclosing consumers’
financial data to third parties.463
If institutions such as hospitals, insurance companies, and banks
are forbidden from surreptitiously sharing personally identifiable
data, then commercial websites too should be held to similar
standards. Though constructive notice may suffice in many contexts,
when data collection practices implicate legally protected privacy
rights, a more stringent notice standard is required. The notice model
in these contexts should be analogous to that of the “knowing and
voluntary” standard in arbitration clause disputes.
Though the knowing and voluntary standard of review is not the
default means of evaluating arbitration contracts, it may be applied in
special cases where arbitration agreements prompt signatories to
forfeit guaranteed legal rights. As the Ninth Circuit suggested in
Nelson v. Bagdad Copper Corp., when websites collect data that is
protected by state and federal statutes, higher standards of notice
should be in place.464 Websites’ privacy terms should not contravene
or undermine the purposes of established privacy laws. Though
websites need not mold their privacy practices according to the
privacy laws of every state or nation, they should provide elevated
notice when collecting particularly sensitive consumer information
that is sometimes protected by statute. Health and financial
information, in particular, should require a more stringent standard of
notice. Not only is this data protected by both state and federal
privacy laws, but it also tends to create greater risks of privacy harms
when collected and shared.465

463. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et. seq. (2012).
Additionally, data handling practices that covertly collect consumer data may
undermine the intent of some state privacy laws.
California’s
Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, for instance, prohibits
companies from installing spyware on consumers’ computers for data collection
purposes. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947-22947.6 (West 2015).
464. See Nelson v. Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Any
bargain to waive the right to a judicial forum for civil rights claims, including those
covered by the [Americans with Disabilities Act] . . . must at least be express.”);
Lindgren v. Pub. Storage, 290 F. App’x 971, 972 (holding that forms signed by a
former employee did not effectuate knowing agreement to submit civil rights claims
against a former employer to arbitration).
465. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2480e(a)(2) (West) (“A person shall not
obtain the credit report of a consumer unless the person has secured the consent of
the consumer, and the report is used for the purpose consented to by the
consumer.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-10-104 (“[A] financial institution may not
disclose to any person, except to the customer or the customer’s agent, any financial
records relating to that customer . . . ”).
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To adapt the “knowing and voluntary” standard for the online
world, companies could expressly notify consumers of their collection
of health or financial data on their homepages. Though websites are
limited in that they cannot apprise consumers with personal warnings,
they can put mechanisms in place to prevent consumer interaction
with their content until a notice statement is acknowledged. A
conspicuous opt-out option would fortify the legal significance of
consumers’ consent. If consumers were actually given the choice to
deny a website’s collection of their sensitive, personally identifiable
data, then their decision to allow this collection to proceed would be
more voluntary and meaningful.
CONCLUSION
Existing legal models can provide valuable insight into the
elements of effective online notice. FDA labeling rules demonstrate
that changing the format of privacy policies could improve their
readability and eye-appeal. Shortening lengthy paragraphs and
distilling long sentences into brief phrases could reduce consumers’
cognitive load and enhance their understanding of key terms. FTC
enforcement actions also provide insight into the essential content of
online notice statements. These actions show that websites should
apprise consumers of material changes to privacy policies and give
them the opportunity to expressly consent to those new terms.466
Finally, jurisprudence of arbitration agreements reveals that there
should be elevated standards of consent when privacy policies prompt
consumers to waive protected legal rights. The “knowing” agreement
standard, as applied to the privacy space, demonstrates that sensitive
health and financial data should not be any less protected online than
it is under federal privacy laws.467
Nevertheless, even if websites were to incorporate essential
elements of effective notice into their privacy statements, notice
problems would remain. Improving notice would not address issues
relating to companies’ unnecessary retention468 of and failure to
secure469 personally identifiable data. Additionally, companies may
not always have notice or control of the data collection practices of

466. See, e.g., Facebook, Complaint, supra note 288, at 7-9.
467. See Lindgren v. Pub. Storage, 290 Fed. Appx. 971 (9th Cir. 2008); Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (2003); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper
Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc.,
121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997).
468. See Reidenberg, et al., supra note 47, at 24.
469. See, e.g., Eli Lily Complaint, supra note 322, at 2.
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third party advertisers that routinely access their websites. Therefore,
even if a company were to draft an ideal privacy policy that
effectively conveyed notice, third party data collection practices could
easily contravene the promises of that policy.470
Despite these limitations, notice remains a vital tool for the
prevention of privacy harms. Companies should draft and format
privacy policies to provide consumers with clear and accurate notice
of websites’ actual data collection practices. Improving the content
and format of privacy policies to mirror legally accepted notice
standards would enhance policies’ usability and eye-appeal to
consumers. Consumers would be more likely to read privacy policies
and actively manage their privacy if they found policies readable and
trustworthy. At the very least, improved policies would supply
constructive notice, and enable inquiring consumers to have a fair
chance of learning about websites’ actual data collection practices.

470. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 5; PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY, supra note 38, at 76-77.
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Table 1: Format of Effective Notice
TYPE OF
NOTICE

NOTICE MECHANISM

Symbolic
disclosures

Symbols, pictograms, and bulleted statements to
accelerate understanding of terms

“Chunked”
formatting

Statements that are “chunked” into brief phrases
as opposed to blocks of text; “chunked”
disclosures organized into lists can serve as userfriendly companions to longer privacy statements

Standardized
sequences of
notice
statements

Standardizing the order in which data collection
practices are disclosed (similar to how all drug
labels disclose drug facts in the same sequence) to
enable consumer comparisons of different privacy
statements

Conspicuous
disclosures
and
warnings

Manipulation of type size, capitalization and bold
type to emphasize critical privacy terms, especially
those relating to collection of personally
identifiable data
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Table 2: Content of Effective Notice
Clear
disclosures

Short, action-oriented
warning statements that
direct consumer behavior;
precise, definite language
and use of the active voice

FDA OTC drug labels,
which clearly describe
steps to take before
consuming a drug (“i.e.
see your doctor if . . . ”
“keep out of reach
from children”). See 21
C.F.R. § 201.66
(5)(ii)(x).

Accurate
disclosures

Privacy policies that
describe the actual nature
and scope of privacy
practices; privacy policies
that do not make promises
that contravene
companies’ actual data
collection practices

See e.g., In re

Notice
statements
that
require
express,
“knowing
and
voluntary”
consumer
assent

Privacy policies that
require express and
informed consumer
consent prior to engaging
in data practices that
implicate legally protected
privacy rights

Elevated notice
standards for the
collection of financial
information like bank
and credit card
numbers (otherwise
protected by the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act); elevated notice
standards for the
collection of health
information such as
medical history
(HIPPA).

Upromise, Inc.,
Complaint, FTC File
No. 102 3116 at 3
(Finding that a
company told users its
toolbar collected
browsing data to offer
savings, but it actually
collected personally
identifiable data such
as banking
information).
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Regular
notification
of
modified
privacy
policy
terms
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Privacy statements that
routinely update
consumers of material
changes and require
express consent before
such changes go into effect
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Requiring express
notice and affirmative
consent when making
private consumer data
public. See, e.g. In re
Facebook, Inc.,
Complaint, FTC File
No. 092 3184.

